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Over the years, scholars have continually debated the effect that foreign assistance
has had on recipient countries. This study aims to continue research in that area by
exploring the effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance to Colombia. Specifically, my
research is designed to investigate the effect of U.S. foreign assistance in three broad
areas of Colombian society: law enforcement, guerrilla violence, and drug production.
Using available data that covers the years 1980-2002, I perform a multivariate
time-series analysis to assess the impact of U.S. foreign assistance on six key dependent
variables; these variables have been selected to illuminate the three broad areas
mentioned above. The dependent variables—and the broader categories with which they
are associated—are as follows: first, in order to measure the impact of U.S. foreign
assistance on drug related law enforcement in Colombia, I analyze a change in the
number of drug labs destroyed, the amount of cocaine and base seized (kilos), and the
amount of coca sprayed (ha) by aerial fumigation; next, I measure the effect of U.S.
foreign assistance on guerrilla violence by regressing foreign assistance on the number of
persons kidnapped (per thousand inhabitants) and number of homicides (per thousand
inhabitants); finally, in order to measure the effect of U.S. foreign assistance on the
overall drug production in Colombia, I regress the amount of foreign assistance on the
total amount of estimated cultivation of coca (ha) in Colombia.
In the areas of law enforcement, guerrilla violence, and drug production, findings
in this study indicate there is no positive correlation between the amount of foreign
assistance given to Colombia from 1980-2002, and any of the aforementioned dependent
variables.
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However, results indicate that the Colombian president’s party affiliation,
Colombia’s GDP per capita, and Colombia’s ‘level of democracy’ (as measured by Polity
IV scores) may have a noteworthy relationship to the overall effectiveness of Colombia’s
law enforcement. Further, when assessing attempts to curb guerrilla violence—in the
form of kidnappings and homicides—Colombia’s presidential party affiliation and its
GDP per capita may also be a determinant of change in violence. Finally, when testing
for a change in levels of Colombia’s drug production, Colombia’s level of democracy, its
rural population density, and its unemployment rate indicate statistically significant
relationships.
Given these findings, my research suggests that past U.S. foreign assistance given
to Colombia, has no significant relationship to assisting Colombia in the successful
attainment of any of the following goals: increasing law enforcement, decreasing
guerrilla violence, or decreasing drug production. Other variables, though, may play a
role in the attainment of these goals. As such, the effectiveness of foreign assistance
should continue to be carefully analyzed in order to reevaluate its overall objectives and
the methods chosen to pursue those objectives—as the United States continues assistance
to Colombia. This study suggests that future foreign assistance to Colombia should focus
on promoting good policies, strong institutions, and eliminating opportunities for
corruption. Furthermore, aid should focus on dual positive effects of improving the lives
of the Colombian people and mitigating the impact of the drug trade.
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Introduction
For the past forty years, the inability of the Colombian government to reduce
guerrilla violence and to decrease drug trafficking has had a dramatic impact on the
country at large. Insurrection, riot, murder, torture, terrorism, and chaos were not just the
story of Colombia’s past; instead, they continue to be a concern for Colombians today.
Overall increases in drug activity and guerrilla violence, as well as a lack of law
enforcement and military efforts, have resulted in an ongoing internal conflict. As a
result, Colombia is currently the most violent nation in South America and one of the
most dangerous places in the world (Sarmeinto 1997:1).
Violence is not a new phenomenon to the people of Colombia. Instead, it has
been a common theme throughout Colombia’s history. Violence reached its peak during
the period known as la violenca, an era whose effects lasted many years. Guerrilla
activity initially emerged during this time—in response to political violence. Guerrillas
organized during la violencia in order to protect the people; however, this would all
change when existing guerrilla groups began to work with drug traffickers, providing
them with services and protection. The relationship between illegally armed groups and
drug traffickers would become increasingly intertwined and made it difficult to assess
who was responsible for what. Major consequences of this close relationship became
noticeable in the 1980s. By this time, one thing was certain, guerrilla groups no longer
existed as a means of protection for the people. Instead, the guerrilla groups were
responsible for the disappearance, kidnapping, and murder of many innocent lives. To
this day, proceeds from the drug trade have made it feasible for guerrilla groups to
operate in all areas of Colombia, terrorizing the entire public, from the rich to the poor.
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As guerrilla groups increasingly profited from the illegal drug industry, the
Colombian government has continued to struggle to stop them. For example, today,
Colombia produces and distributes more heroin than any other country in the Western
Hemisphere. In addition, it is the world’s leading producer and distributor of cocaine
(Rabasa 2001:11). Approximately 90% of the world’s cocaine industry originates in, or
passes through, Colombia (Veilette 2005:3).
Guerrilla groups and drug traffickers have been especially successful due to the
profit made from the drug trade, along with the geological make up of the country.
Colombia’s volcanic soil and mountainous jungles have provided an ideal environment
for the growth and production of drugs. As a result, many areas in Colombia have been
difficult for the government to monitor—making it easier for illegal drug activity to
persist. Overall, the Colombian military has had very little success combating the war on
drugs. As a result, profits from the drug trade have allowed guerrilla groups to become
wealthier and more powerful than the Colombian government itself.
After failing at to enact peace treaties with existing guerilla organizations such as
the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), the ELN (Ejército de
Liberación Nacional), and the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia), Colombian
officials have turned to the United States for assistance. In 1999, Colombian President
Pastrana drafted a six-year initiative called Plan Colombia, a proposal to help end the
country’s conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote social and economic
development. In support of this plan, the United States agreed to provide $1.3 billion in
economic, military, and narcotics assistance. By doing so, the United States nearly
tripled overall assistance being sent to Colombia. In 2002, the Bush administration
2

continued funding under Plan Colombia in addition to requesting more assistance under
The Andean Counter-drug Initiative (ACI). Through the ACI, foreign aid is given to
Colombia to eradicate coca and opium crops, interdict narcotics trafficking, protect the
country’s infrastructure, train Colombia’s security forces, support alternative crop
development programs, and preserve democracy.
Ever since the 1990s, a significant amount of U.S. foreign aid has been distributed
to Colombia in order to assist the Colombian government in reaching specific objectives.
However, the effectiveness of foreign assistance has been a topic of continual debate
among scholars.

For instance, while some experts say that foreign assistance has

generally been successful, others claim that foreign assistance does not help alleviate a
country’s problems at all. Since theory regarding the effectiveness of foreign aid is split,
one could ask the question: given that Colombia has received such a large portion of U.S.
foreign assistance over the years, exactly how effective has foreign assistance been at
successfully influencing the country?

Specifically, how has aid affected areas of

Colombian society such as its law enforcement, guerrilla violence, and overall drug
production?

3

1. The Effectiveness of Foreign Assistance
The Benefits of Foreign Aid
While it may seem obvious how foreign assistance can benefit a recipient country,
in most instances, distributing foreign assistance actually benefits the donor both
economically and militarily. From a U.S. (donor) perspective, the economic interest of
other countries is important to the well-being of the United States. The U.S. economy
depends greatly upon the import of raw materials from other nations, along with the
potentially large consumer’s market from developing countries (Black 1968:17).
Therefore, if developing countries experience economic growth, it is likely to benefit the
United States.
Although there is an economic incentive to give foreign aid, perhaps the greatest
benefit is seen from a military perspective. The United States can use military aid,
training, and equipment to significantly influence a country to comply with its requests.
This is called leverage, and was especially evident during the Cold War, when aid was
used to help create a much-needed, worldwide defense network against the threat of
communism (Sislin 1994:668).
Leverage has also been a successful tool for ending international confrontations,
such as the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. In this instance, Nixon promised the Israeli military
more assistance after the war, but only if it accepted a cease-fire. However, the U.S. also
threatened to take away aid if Israel continued to engage in warfare. Here, the United
States was able to use positive and negative sanctions to produce a desired outcome
(Sislin 1994:666-668).
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In addition to creating leverage, military aid is sometimes used as a symbol of
power among wealthy nations.

In the article, “Foreign Assistance: Objectives and

Consequences,” Griffin and Enos find that countries who donate assistance are those
countries that have money to spare. Therefore, aid is sometimes donated to yield political
support from developing countries; this makes it look as if the donating country has more
international support than others (Griffin 1970:316). This seems to be the case with the
United States during the Cold War. Assistance was given to developing countries, in
order to form more allies than the Soviet Union. There were few real objectives of that
assistance other than stopping the spread of communism. How would the United States
achieve that? By funding a country’s military and giving money to those in power.
Finally, military assistance is sometimes used to promote democratic principles.
This is especially true with recent programs such as Bush’s Millennium Challenge
Account. When U.S. foreign aid programs successfully promote democracy abroad, the
probability that the United States will go to war with that country is lowered, since
democratic nations are significantly less likely to engage in war with other democratic
nations (Carothers 1995:2).
Not only does this decrease the chance of war, but giving aid to these countries
allows the U.S. military to have an inside look at what is going on in various areas around
the world. For example, although the United States takes a financial risk by spending so
much money on Plan Colombia, the plan does allow for U.S. involvement in key strategic
locations in the Caribbean, South America, and the Eastern Pacific. It enables the United
States to be directly involved in maintaining the stability of a country that is the fifth
largest trading partner in Latin America for the United States, and the tenth largest
5

supplier of oil (Marcella 2003:2). It also provides the U.S. military surveillance aircraft
support for Pentagon counter-drug operations (Clarke 2000:1). Distributing foreign aid
opens the door for the United States to have power in many areas of the world, possibly
shaping ideology abroad, and in turn, improving U.S. security at home.
The Potential Benefits of Receiving Foreign Aid
Although the United States benefits from giving aid, ironically, it is debated
among scholars how much a recipient country actually benefits from the foreign aid it
receives. Ideally, the recipient nation benefits not only economically from receiving aid,
but militarily as well. In addition, aid can potentially change the living conditions for
people across the globe, especially in underdeveloped countries.
From an economic standpoint, in some instances, aid has helped decrease poverty
in many areas of the world. According to the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP), foreign assistance has been successful in decreasing poverty worldwide.
According to them, due to aid, “poverty has been reduced more in the past 50 years than
in the past 500” (Thérien 2000:23).

In addition to reducing poverty, aid has also

increased the quality of life for many people. In some instances, aid has helped to
decrease child mortality and the spread of disease. It has also improved access to clean
water and has promoted overall health. Foreign aid programs have even been successful
in promoting women’s rights and increasing education opportunities for boys and girls
worldwide (Thérien 2000:22). Programs have successfully built infrastructure, promoted
agriculture and manufacturing, and provided skilled manpower (Cassen 1994:10).
Overall, well-designed aid projects can help support public institutions which, in turn,
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improve experimentation, learning, and implementation of new service ideas (World
Bank 1998:3).
From a military perspective, aid can increase security within various countries by
providing a larger military, better training, and excellent military equipment. It also can
increase stability within the country through “election monitoring, institution-building,
and capacity development” (Thérien 2000:23).

By promoting democracy, foreign

assistance can have a direct positive influence on the peace and security within a nation.
Aid Effectiveness-Both Sides Presented
Existing literature regarding the actual effect that foreign assistance has on a
recipient country in terms of growth, is split, and sometimes referred to as the “micromacro paradox” (Durbarry 1998:1). This paradox alludes to the fact that while foreign
aid projects have been evaluated as relatively successful in achieving the specific goals
they set forth and therefore have had individual effects (e.g. Cassen 1986); studies
conducted at the nation-wide level indicate that, foreign assistance has little to no direct
relationship with the growth of the recipient country. In other words, while micro-based
studies have found that aid is effective, at the macro-level, studies have resulted in more
ambiguous results. For example, some scholars have found that as aid increased to
developing countries, the country’s growth rate was unaffected or even hindered. Other
studies find that foreign assistance is a determinant of growth, under the right recipient
environment. This section explores past studies that have tested the relationship between
aid and growth in developing countries.
Although aid has the potential to do great things, the degree to which aid directly
affects the growth rate of a recipient country is difficult to measure and has been debated
7

among scholars. In the early 1970s, Griffin and Enos tested the effectiveness of aid by
analyzing fifteen African and Asian countries from 1962-1964. Their studies concluded
that there was not an association between the amount of foreign aid received and the
GNP growth rate (Griffin 1970:317). In addition to African and Asian countries, they
also analyze the average growth rate of twelve Latin American countries from 19571964. Their analysis concluded that as foreign assistance increased to Latin American
countries, the growth rate of the recipient country decreased (Griffin 1970:318).
Overall, Griffin and Enos found that foreign assistance was not associated with
the growth rate of the recipient country. In the instance that foreign assistance was
correlated with growth, foreign aid had a negative effect on the growth rate. They argue
that an overall increase in aid led to lower savings on behalf of the recipient country. In
addition they argued that, in some instances, aid also slowed down long-run economic
growth by changing methods of investment that did not benefit the recipient country
(Griffin 1970:323).
Years later, Peter Boon furthered the study on aid’s effectiveness, when he
conducted a study in which he looked at aid to 97 countries between 1971 and 1990.
Boon’s results were similar to those of Griffin and Enos. In his analysis, Boon found that
aid did not increase investment nor did it promote growth. According to Boon, not only
was aid ineffective in terms of economic growth, but he argued that aid did not reduce
poverty or even address basic human needs. In his study, Boon found that foreign aid
had an insignificant effect on alleviating poverty, increasing life expectancy, decreasing
infant mortality, or improving primary schooling ratios (Boon 1996: 293). One reason
for this is because, according to Boon, poverty is not caused by capital shortage, but
8

instead, caused by political policies that do not consider the poor. The reason that aid is
not associated with growth is because aid does not change these policies.

In fact,

according to Boon, foreign assistance may even harm the recipient country. Boon found
that foreign assistance may actually increase inequality by giving assistance that benefits
the elite and does not reach the poor (Boon 1996:289-329).
Ian Vasquez also looked at the correlation between aid flows and economic
growth.

His findings were consistent with those of Griffin and Boon.

Vasquez

discovered disappointing results in his study of aid that was distributed to 73 countries
from 1971 to 1995. He stated:
Neither aid per capita, nor aid as percentage of GDP, was positively correlated
with economic growth. (In fact, aid as a percentage of GDP has a slightly negative
correlation with economic growth). When broken down by the various aid
sources, the lack of any positive correlation with growth holds despite the fact that
the various bilateral and multilateral agencies have emphasized different
approaches to lending (the World Bank, for example only lends to governments,
while the U.S. Agency for International Development can approve credit directly
to nongovernmental organizations and other private groups) even though a
common principle objective has been the promotion of growth (Vasquez 1998:2).
According to Vasquez, aid does not promote growth because of conflicting goals between
the donor and recipient countries. In addition, aid does not go to the people; it goes to the
government. As a result, overall consumption may increase, but aid does not increase
investment which leads to growth.
Griffin, Boon, and Vasquez all failed to find a positive significant link between
aid and growth. Their research was confirmed by a study in 1997 by the Congressional
Budget Office, which stated that, “foreign aid, overall, appears to have only a marginal
effect on development and may even hinder it” (cited in Vasquez 1998:2). In addition, a
study conducted by the World Bank in 1994 showed that the majority of the aid bypasses
9

the poor (Vasquez 1998:2).

According to the World Bank, too many developing

countries take on projects, supported by foreign assistance, which are not designed to
create growth or have an effect on poverty. Instead, programs mainly benefit the rich
(World Bank 1998:2).
In sum, there have been multiple studies that support the notion that foreign
assistance is not effective in aiding in a country’s growth, and often fails to reach the
poor or to improve the overall quality of life in the country receiving the aid. Although
studies have been consistent with these findings, other analysis of foreign assistance
challenges those views.
One study, conducted by Burnside and Dollar, does find that aid is a determinant
of growth. Burnside and Dollar looked at 56 developing countries from 1970-1993.
They find that the impact of aid on growth is positive in good policy environments. They
find, as did Boon, that aid had no systematic impact on economic policies that affect
growth. However, where an increase in aid coincided with good policies, aid had a
positive relationship with growth (Burnside 2000:32).
Similar to Burnside and Dollar, Durbarry analyzed 68 developing countries from
1970-1993. He also found that foreign aid does have a positive impact on growth,
however, as suggested by Burnside and Dollar, the positive impact is conditional on a
strong policy environment. According to Durbarry, the economic environment of the
country is an important determinant of growth (Durbarry 1998:17). Although Durbarry
found a positive correlation between aid and growth, the study also found that very high
amounts of aid/GDP ratios are associated with slower growth.

In addition, those

countries receiving foreign aid that is less than 13 percent of its GDP showed
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insignificant growth effects (Durbarry 1998:17).

Therefore, the amount of foreign

assistance/GDP ratio may be associated with how aid impacts the growth rate of the
recipient country.
In addition to strong policies, some scholars such as James Gwartney and Robert
Lawson have found a strong link, not between foreign aid and economic prosperity, but
between economic freedom and economic prosperity. Gwartney and Lawson researched
the level of economic freedom in more than 100 countries from 1975 to 1995. They
found that economic freedom positively influenced growth, and that achieving high levels
of freedom, over time, produced a higher national income level. When growth occurs,
Vasquez argues, initial goals to reduce poverty and increase the quality of life are met.
Therefore, if aid is not used to promote economic freedom, it reduces the probability that
aid will successfully reach its goals (Vasquez 1998:3). Making sure recipient countries
have strong policies that promote economic freedom may be an important component of
finding a solution to the debate that surrounds the effectiveness of aid.
Although studies at the macro-level have indicated ambiguous results when
identifying a relationship between aid and growth, at the micro-level, evaluations of
foreign aid programs have found that in most cases, aid is effective. Robert Cassen,
looks at the impact of aid from a more general perspective. Instead of testing to see if aid
is a determinant of growth, he looks at the impact that foreign aid programs may have on
a recipient country. According to Cassen, foreign assistance may have a positive impact
on the country as a whole, through aid supported programs that are targeted to benefit the
people. If a foreign aid program can successfully meet the needs of the people, then aid
has affected the recipient country.
11

After surveying many foreign aid projects, Cassen notes in his book, Does Aid
Work?, that the performance of aid varies by country, but overall, aid does have a
positive effect on the recipient country. According to Cassen, “the great majority of aid
succeeds in its developmental objectives” (Cassen 1994:9). He argues that although aid
programs are not perfect and do not always reach their goals, aid “serves multiple causes”
and one “should not condemn the entire enterprise” (Cassen 1994:2). Cassen’s belief that
aid is effective is derived from the past success of countries receiving foreign assistance.
For example, The Asian Development Bank evaluated 139 projects in Asia; 97 of 139
projects were completed successfully (Cassen 1994:8).
Cassen finds that aid programs have also been successful at decreasing poverty.
Civilians have indirectly benefited from projects directed toward reducing the cost of
food in South America, Southeast Asia, and Africa (Cassen 1994:91). Cassen admits that
some programs do fail; however, he believes that, overall, aid is effective and should
continue to be distributed and analyzed.
According to Durbarry, the reason for the macro-micro paradox is unclear.
However, each study typically differs in terms of sample size, data quality, and
econometric technique and specification. According to Durbarry, studies that test the
effect of aid on growth, typically do not adequately specify the underlying growth model
(Durbarry 1998:1). For example, some studies ignore specific aspects of growth theory
which involve a more sophisticated empirical analysis. These are common criticisms of
aid-growth literature.
Until more studies indicate that aid is a determining factor of growth, one may be
inclined to agree with William Easterly who believes that large international aid agencies
12

actually harm the recipient country. In his article, “The Cartel of Good Intentions,”
Easterly criticizes the international aid bureaucracy and claims that it will never work
properly. His main concern is that the distribution of aid often puts developing countries
in a prototypical “catch-22” situation. According to Easterly, developing countries that
receive aid cannot sufficiently express their needs, nor can they afford to turn the aid
away. Therefore, Easterly believes the international aid community operates similar to a
cartel, for it thrives on customers who have no power to complain or to find alternate
solutions. For Easterly, although their intentions may be benevolent, nations involved in
the “foreign aid business” allow few alternatives for developing countries and are solely
accountable to themselves (Easterly 2002:40-42).
Foreign Aid and Failure to Meet Objectives
Although foreign aid has helped in some circumstances, sometimes, foreign aid
fails to meet its objectives.

Why is foreign aid successful in some cases, and

unsuccessful in others? One reason may be that in many instances, foreign aid attempts
to accomplish amazing things in very difficult circumstances.

The United States

constantly tries to implement foreign aid in countries with poor policies and institutions.
This is risky and is likely to fail from the beginning. While the primary reason for
distribution of foreign aid is to promote U.S. objectives and foreign policy, the most
common reason for failure is the excessive implementation of these policies and the
motives behind them. Often times, the interests of the donor prevail over the needs of the
recipient (Thérien 2000:31).
Another reason foreign aid programs fail is due to a lack of knowledge about the
environment or culture in which the program is going to be implemented. Many of the
13

programs will never succeed because they are not tailored to the needs of the community.
Communication between donor and recipient is crucial when designing a program funded
by U.S. foreign aid (Cassen 1994:15). The World Bank agrees, and strongly advises the
involvement of local communities in the design and implementation of developing
projects to solve this problem (World Bank 1998:3).
Possible Solutions
Although foreign aid has been primarily ineffective with respect to overall
growth, new theories exist that may contribute to success in the future. For example, the
World Bank has taken steps to reengineer the way assistance is delivered to developing
countries, hopefully bringing about long-term change.

Its new objectives are more

specifically designed to do the following: achieve broad-based economic growth,
increase democratic activity, stabilize the world population and protect human health,
protect the environment, and provide humanitarian assistance. In order to achieve their
goals, overseas operations have become more “team-oriented.” These teams have the
power to make decisions and to manage their activities as needed. Teams have also
allowed host-country partners to have an active role in creating new strategies and
projects (GAO 1997:7). Hopefully, by giving teams the independence to make needed
decisions, along with an overall effort to achieve specific goals, USAID programs will
achieve success that is directly correlated with overall economic growth.
While it is not exactly clear to what degree foreign aid may influence economic
growth, studies provide more concise information when it comes to military assistance.
As mentioned earlier, military assistance sometimes creates leverage that is used to
manipulate another country. Although leverage is successful in some situations and
14

unsuccessful in others, studies indicate that there are actors that are more likely to
produce a desired outcome. According to a study conducted by John Sislin, manipulation
is more likely to occur if positive sanctions are used instead of negative sanctions.
Similarly, success is more common among civilian regimes than military regimes. His
study also concluded that in the past, as the recipient country acquired more American
arms, it became more susceptible to U.S. influence (Sislin 1994:680). Although his study
gives the data necessary to make a variety of predictions, “it is still not entirely resolved
why arms influence, succeed or fail” (Sislin1994:682).
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2. A Historical Overview of U.S. Aid Distribution
In order to take a closer look at the effectiveness of foreign assistance in
Colombia, in addition to understanding the importance of foreign assistance in current
U.S. foreign policy, it is important to examine the most common reasons aid has been
distributed in the past, along with the most recent objectives of foreign aid. It is also
important to examine when foreign aid has been effective in the past, when it has been
ineffective, and why.
Early Aid Distribution-Post WWII and Cold War Objectives
Foreign aid is not a new topic of discussion. The distribution of U.S. foreign aid
began following World War II. Back then, it was primarily allocated to help alleviate
human suffering, to help rehabilitate and reconstruct damaged infrastructure, and to assist
in overall recovery throughout the world. In 1945, under the Bretton Woods agreement,
the United States partnered with other countries to establish two multilateral
organizations that still exist, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, now called the World Bank). The
primary responsibility of these organizations is to assist in debt relief and economic
development as well as to predict creditors’ interests while doing so (Nowels 2004:1).
Initial allocations of foreign aid went toward war relief (Black 1968:4-5).
Developing countries began to desire independence and a new way of living that
appeared nearly impossible to attain. Without U.S. intervention, they had two choices as
to how they could achieve their goals. They could either turn to the Soviet bloc for help,
or turn inwards on their own country, taking the resources they need, while oppressing
those under their authority (McClellan 1957:13). In June 1947, the U.S. Secretary of
16

State, General George C. Marshall, introduced a plan that would distribute U.S. aid to
help lessen hunger, poverty, and chaos in European countries. Although initial aid was
distributed more for humanitarian reasons, aid shortly became the prominent tool used by
the United States to combat the spread of communism (Schraeder 1998:4). Marshall’s
plan was the perfect way to help contain the Soviet bloc by strengthening U.S. ties with
the recipient countries, thus ensuring the protection of U.S. interests during the Cold War
(Nowels 2004:1). Overall, the “Marshall Plan” was considered a success because it
succeeded in these goals.
Since the Marshall Plan proved to be effective, President Harry Truman
announced that foreign aid would continue to play an important role in foreign policy. In
his inaugural speech, he made it clear that one of his objectives was to give developing
countries the opportunities they need to achieve their “aspirations of a better life” (Black
1968:5). Another objective, called Point Four, was designed to increase the availability
of technical support offered to other countries. Truman called Point Four a “bold new
program” that would allow different programs to help underdeveloped countries use
available resources to increase their standard of living (Black 1968:14).

Although

programs were specifically designed to help alleviate suffering in underdeveloped
countries, aid was being strategically used by the United States to influence international
policy and the ideology of people in other countries—specifically regarding communism
(Schraeder 1998:3-5).
Although President Truman discussed foreign aid and the importance of aid as a
component of foreign policy, it was not until 1961 that the United States would establish
an agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), charged with
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administering foreign aid assistance (Nowels 2005:1).

According to the Foreign

Assistance Act of 1961, the use of foreign aid was “to promote foreign policy, security,
and the general welfare of the United States by assisting people of the world in their
efforts toward economic development and internal and external security, and for other
purposes” (Black 1968:14). During this time, President Kennedy also established the
Peace Corps. He encouraged Americans to donate their time and money to help others
around the world who lived in poverty (Nowels 2004:1).
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s foreign aid expanded beyond Western Europe
and Japan, and was distributed to U.S. allies in the Middle East, South Asia, and subSaharan Africa. (Nowels 2004:2). Although aid expanded globally, it did not take long
for this expansion to be criticized. In the 1980s, the romanticized idea of using foreign
aid to help the impoverished countries around the world took a turn for the worse.
During the Reagan and Bush administrations, aid was “primarily used to promote
American investment, market economies and national interests, and again, to protect
other countries from communist influence” (Nowels 2004:2). However, by the mid1980s, the idea of distributing U.S. foreign aid across the world gradually became less
and less popular. As the threat of communism began to wane, so did the strategic
importance of foreign aid. Furthermore, reports of corruption and misuse of funds in
foreign countries were often in the news. This was no surprise to the United States, as it
had previously funded many violent, repressive regimes, giving them economic and
military assistance in return for their loyalty during the Cold War. The United States
overlooked various violations of international law and made many exceptions for
“friendly dictators of strategic importance” (Hartmann 2001:9).
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Foreign Aid and Recent Worldwide Objectives
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks marked a turning point in the allocation
of foreign aid. Foreign aid had always been an important function of U.S. foreign policy;
however, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, “U.S. foreign aid (took) on a more strategic
sense of importance” (Tarnoff 2004:2). After all, U.S. leaders had to be extremely
mindful of whether aid packages might ultimately facilitate the ulterior aims of militant
factions, as well as how the strategic distribution of assets might help to prevent a future
attack. As a result, the primary objective for distributing aid remained national security,
but changed from combating communism to combating terrorism (Brainard 2003:149).
For example, in September 2002, President George H.W. Bush recognized global
development, along with defense and diplomacy, to be the top concerns related to U.S.
national security. This was the first time in history such emphasis was placed on global
development, and that emphasis manifested itself in the form of increased foreign aid
spending. For instance, Bush promised Afghanistan $4.5 billion and “announced his
intention to request an increase of $5 billion per year over current foreign assistance
levels of $12.5 billion through the creation of a bilateral development fund called the
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)” (Brainard 2003:149).
The Millennium Challenge Corporation, an independent government agency,
allotted new funding to countries with a commitment to “govern justly, invest in people,
and encourage economic freedom” (Brainard 2003:149). Its goals also include cutting
poverty in half by year 2015, improving maternal and child health, increasing literacy
levels, and combating AIDS and other diseases (Nowels 2004:2).

The underlying

assumption beneath these objectives was that improving the overall quality of life for
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citizens in certain parts of the world would ultimately reduce the likelihood of terrorist
attacks.
As the threat of terrorism has initiated discussion about foreign aid, the U.S.-Iraq
war that began in 2003 has highlighted the issue of foreign aid, forcing it into the
conversations of many Americans. Since mid-2003, Iraq has received over $20 billion
for reconstruction activities, and it was the largest aid recipient in FY2004 (Tarnoff
2004:1-3). Furthermore, “reconstruction costs in Iraq now exceed all other U.S. foreign
aid spending, and fighting terrorism is now seen as the leading goal of American foreign
aid efforts” (Nowels 2004:2). Although disaster relief has also been at the forefront of
aid distribution, U.S. assistance in Iraq remains the largest aid initiative since the
Marshall Plan in 1947 (Nowels 2004:2).
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3. Past Foreign Assistance and Latin America
Aid Distribution, Communism, Drugs, and Terrorism
Similar to the reasons for which U.S. foreign assistance was distributed worldwide, the United States has given past foreign assistance to Latin America in order to
prevent Soviet expansion and increase national security. During the Cold War, the
United States did whatever was necessary to create allies and influence a country’s stance
on communism. It was no secret that the United States distributed foreign assistance to
many Latin American dictators during the Cold War.

However, as the threat of

communism subsided, foreign assistance to Latin America switched from combating the
spread of communism, to fighting the ‘war on drugs.’ In the 1980s, it became obvious
that countries in Latin America, primarily located in the Andes, were trafficking large
amounts of drugs into the United States. As the drug trade became more popular, the
United States realized the need to take an anti-drug stance and partner with Latin
America in fighting the drug war. As a result, U.S. foreign assistance was distributed to
Latin America in order to meet specific anti-drug objectives. Although throughout the
1980s and 1990s, U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America focused on drug eradication
and interdiction efforts, the events of September 11, 2001 would affect U.S. foreign
policy toward Latin America, the same way that it did the rest of the world—by shifting
its focus to combat terrorist activity.
Latin America and Military Assistance
Although many types of foreign assistance have been given to Latin America, the
most common type of foreign assistance given to Latin American countries has come in
the form of military aid; however, the United States has not always been the primary
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source of military aid. Prior to the late-1930s, Latin American countries mainly counted
on European countries for aid. For example, Argentina and Bolivia primarily depended
on Germany, where Peru and Chile depended on France; Italy also contributed to military
efforts in Latin American countries. European assistance not only stressed the traditional
security efforts, but also focused attention on improving engineering and management
(Baines 1972:471).
It was around the late 1930s when the United States began to get involved in
sending assistance to Latin American countries—primarily in the form of military
assistance. During this time, the United States sent several military missions to Latin
America, thus taking a more active role in establishing military forces in the Western
Hemisphere. Shortly thereafter, Latin American countries began to rely heavily on the
United States as their primary arms supplier; “by 1945, the United States had acquired a
monopoly in military assistance to Latin America” (Baines 1972:471). As mentioned, the
distribution of military assistance to Latin American countries was an extremely
important tool used by the United States during the Cold War.
Assistance continued to Latin America in 1951, when the U.S. Congress
appropriated roughly $40 million in military assistance to Latin American countries
through the Mutual Security Act of 1951. This act insisted that countries receiving
military assistance comply with specific terms and conditions established by the United
States. In addition, U.S. military advisers were assigned to each participating country to
determine specific military requirements. Although large amounts of aid were distributed
to Latin American countries, the United States had a direct influence on how the aid was
being used (Baines 1972:472).
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Until the 1950s, assistance to Latin America was primarily used for hemispheric
defense. However, the 1960s marked a turning point in the nature of assistance in Latin
America. The Kennedy administration “decided to shift the basis of its military policy in
Latin America from hemispheric defense to internal security, from protection of the
hemisphere’s coastline and sea lanes, to internal defense of Latin American governments
against Castro-communist subversion, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare” (Baines
1972:474). This shift took the focus off external influence, and emphasized promoting
internal security. The logic being, that if the internal security of a nation improved, the
international threat of that state is likely to decrease.
Although the Kennedy administration switched its focus from defense to internal
security, the threat of the spread of communism was not completely out of the picture.
Therefore, the United States continued to take precautions.

If, for some reason,

communism made its way into Latin America, the United States would have continual
problems knocking at its door. Ensuring Latin America remained allied to the United
States was a very important task, and military aid was used to guarantee an anticommunist stance (Schraeder 1998:5).

The United States wanted Latin American

countries to be politically, militarily, and economically dependent on the United States.
This would allow the United States to have a stronger influence in Latin America (Mower
1979: 146-147). Investing in the strength of Latin American militaries not only helped
guarantee an anti-communist stance, but also helped increase security within each
country. This was intended to reduce problems at the back door of the United States and
to provide a system for U.S. influence.
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Although the threat of communism was no longer the primary reason for military
aid distribution, U.S. military aid to Latin America increased in the 1980s and 1990s as
the drug trade began to surface. Post-Cold War priorities regarding Latin America
revolved around international and domestic concerns such as immigration and the drug
war.

In fact, in his presidential campaign speech, President George H.W. Bush

announced that the answer to winning the drug war was simple, “…eradicate narcotics at
their source” (Quoted in Crandall 2001:100). Therefore, Latin America continued to
receive military assistance in order to fight the war on drugs.
All Countries are not Created Equal
Although total military aid increased to Latin America, distribution has been
anything but uniform across recipient countries. This is especially true for countries in
the Andean region that received U.S. anti-drug money during the 1980s and 1990s.
Countries such as Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, El Salvador and Honduras received almost all
of the U.S. military aid, while the remaining 15 countries were left with less than 5%
(Fitch 1993: 5).
As Fitch suggests, when considering the fact that only a few countries received
the majority of military aid distributed to Latin America, increased aid does not seem as
significant. This is because while one can see an overall increase of military aid in terms
of nominal dollars, subtracting prominent recipients from regional totals (most of which
are located in the Andes) demonstrates a decrease in military aid to Latin America in the
1970s, an increase in the 1980s, and a greater increase in the 1990s. Overall, trends of
military aid to Latin American countries demonstrate the implementation of specific
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programs designed to carry out various objectives and agendas—but only in specific
countries (Fitch 1993:1-9).
Colombia is one of these specific countries that have continued to receive U.S.
foreign assistance for anti-drug efforts. In fact, since 1989, Colombia has been the third
largest recipient of U.S. military aid in the world (Aviles 2001:39). In order to fully
understand how foreign assistance has impacted Colombia, it is beneficial to study
Colombia’s history. By examining Colombia’s past, one can see how Colombia evolved
into a weak state, and how its history may affect any recent foreign aid efforts to improve
its overall condition.
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4. Colombia-Violence, Guerrillas, and Drugs
The Early Days
It may seem surprising that a country with one of South America’s oldest and
most durable democracies would have so many current social, economic, and political
problems. Apart from being the world’s largest supplier of cocaine, Colombia is known
as one of the most violent places in the world (Brauer 2004:447). In addition to having
the highest number of kidnappings in the world, in the last ten years, Colombia’s
homicide rate has been among the highest in Latin America (Sarmiento 1997:1).
Today, Colombia’s violent environment primarily revolves around drug related
guerrilla activity; however, this has not always been the case. Colombia’s history shows
a pattern of violence starting immediately preceding its independence (Hartlyn 1988:21).
Initially, guerrilla activity emerged in response to Colombia’s political and economic
conditions. Guerrillas existed to protect the people, especially the poor. Over time,
however, guerrillas became more interested in the thriving drug trade than protecting the
people. As a result, they turned inward on the people of Colombia, ironically, attacking
those they once protected. As their ties to the drug trade grew, guerrillas increased in
number and power, eventually exerting more of an influence than the Colombian
government (Ramsey 1973:2). When it comes to discussing past or present violence in
Colombia, one thing is certain; over the years, the Colombian people have suffered dire
consequences from political upheaval, guerrilla violence, and ongoing drug activity, all of
which has resulted in a very weak state.
Although the majority of literature covering the violence in Colombia begins with
“La Violencia,” violence in Colombia dates back as early as the 1800s. During the
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nineteenth century the Colombian population began to identify with either the
Conservative party or Liberal party. Party identification became important because once
a person identified with one party; it became nearly impossible to switch affiliation
(Hartlyn 1988:16). Both parties shared opposite views regarding church-state relations.
The Conservative party allied with the Roman Catholic Church. In contrast, the Liberal
party wanted to reduce the power of the church because it believed the influence of the
church would be detrimental to the intellectual growth of the nation (Ruiz 2001:41).
Table 1 shows the emergence of the Conservative and Liberal political parties. 1
After the post-independence conflicts from 1827-1832, seven major civil confrontations
were fought in the second half of the nineteenth century, while several other small-scale
conflicts were fought in different regions throughout the country (Hartlyn 1988:21).
Nineteenth-century violence escalated when conflict regarding President Núñez’
political and economic reform led to a brief civil war. This civil war was preceded by
one of the greatest and bloodiest civil wars in all of Colombian history, known as the War
of One Thousand Days (Hartlyn 1988:25). This three year war was among the country’s
most intense conflicts, and was fought between the Liberal and Conservative parties.
John D. Martz explained the political situation during this time:
The state was the prime regulator, coordinator, and pacesetter of the entire
national system, the apex of the pyramid from which patronage, wealth, power
and programs flow. The form of the government dated back to 1899 and during
that time no real system of checks and balances existed. The lack of
accountability prompted extremist elements of the Conservative party to exploit
the resources of the government for its political benefit and to exclude the Liberal
party. Complicating matters further in 1899, were Liberal allegations of tainted
elections. Conservative party repression and denial of executive office to others

1

All tables and figures are located in the Appendices.
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at all levels increased, and triggered the 1899 War of One Thousand Days (Ruiz
2001:41).
The Liberal party did its best to assemble together in preparation for war, but it
was too unorganized. As a result, it suffered a defeat in Bucaramanga on November
1899. Despite the loss, the Liberal party regained what was left, and continued to press
on, winning the battle of Peralonso the following month. However, their victory did not
last long. Five months later, the Liberals found themselves completely outnumbered by
the Conservative forces. Out of sheer necessity, they switched their code of combat from
one of conventional military tactics to one of guerrilla warfare. Although the Liberals
would not gain power, the switch to guerrilla warfare would bring about a new type of
fighting that would plague the country for the next 100 years (Ruiz 2001:42).
As a result of the war, approximately 100,000 lives were lost. Although the war
had technically ended and the Conservative party had regained power, and violence
continued throughout the country. Conflict between the Conservative and Liberal parties
remained imminent. In addition, divisions within the governing party often led to partial
inter-party alliances designed to either promote or discourage political ideas regarding
ideological issues, regional interest, or personal interest.

Although moderate

Conservative and Liberal politicians tried to cooperate, a solution could not be
negotiated. Extremists from both parties would not allow peace, thus finding ways to
engender violence for many years after the war (Hartlyn 1988:20).
In 1904, General Rafael Reyes was elected President. Despite his efforts to boost
the economy and curb the conflict, most prominent in the countryside, Reyes had little
success. The government was failing to increase industrial growth or to implement
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strong economic measures; this caused extremists from both parties to become even more
agitated.

Moreover, the lack of land reform and the absence of adequate working

conditions for laborers began to spark protests from city to city. Landowners were being
attacked by squatters on a regular basis and workers were beginning to organize in
response to harsh labor conditions (Ruiz 2001:43-44).
Gradually, workers began to form unions which later led to strikes and riots. For
example, major banana, railroad, and field workers began to strike in 1928, causing
problems for businessmen. Due to the constant strikes by union workers, General Cortéz
Vargas was ordered to address the issue. In order to end the chaos, Vargas began to
imprison hundreds of union workers.

When the striking workers reacted violently

towards Vargas and his troops, he ordered his men to kill them and everyone who stood
by them. This resulted in the deaths of hundreds (Ruiz 2001:44). Due to the political
conflict and constant strikes from union workers, violence became evident from the
countryside to the cities.
La Violencia
One of the longest armed conflicts and world’s most complicated civil wars of its
time was known as la violencia (Ramsey 1973:1). Some scholars date la violencia as far
back as 1930 when the Liberal party came to power and began to carry out massacres,
assassinations, and riots against the Conservative party.

Although violence existed

during this time, it only lasted a year and then subsided until 1946, when chaos broke out
again-due to the election of Conservative candidate, Mariano Ospina Pérez (Bailey
1967:565). Along with his newly acquired title as president came insurrection, rebellion,
and riots. Conservatives saw Pérez’ election as an opportunity to enact revenge against
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Liberals for the violence bestowed on the former in 1930 (Bailey 1967:565). The Ospina
government provoked violence as they set out to obtain control over every governmental
position the Liberals had directed during the past 12 years.

Throughout Ospina’s

presidency, his rule became more oppressive against the Liberals. He banned all public
meetings and fired all the Liberal governors. He did everything he could to intimidate
and harass members of the Liberal party (Ruiz 2001:51).
As violence began to escalate, certain techniques of torture became so
commonplace that they were given names. Among these were picar para tamal, which
consisted of cutting up the body of a living victim into small pieces. Other techniques
included inflicting small puncture wounds all over the body, causing the body to bleed to
death. Men and women throughout Colombia were crucified, hung, and raped. Luiz
López de Mesa, an astute commentator, wrote this, regarding la violencia,
…all nations of the Earth have shown cruelty as horrible and destructive as
ours…But I find in our ethical situation an element and a refinement of horror
unknown in the world, because the cruelty was applied, not to adversaries or
possible rivals, but to brothers, equal in situation, or even more humble and
innocent (Bailey 1967:563).
Just when Colombians believed things could not get any worse, violence spiked as a
major riot broke out in Colombia’s capital.
El Bogotazo
In 1948, the assassination of former presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán
intensified la violencia. Gaitán was a man with a proven track record for defending the
poor, and was one of Colombia’s most important politicians. Gaitán attempted to bring
the country together and to give all people equal standing in the eyes of the law. He
advocated an eight-hour working day, accident and health insurance, paid holidays and
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protection for women and children. Over the years, he gained much popularity as the
governor of Bogotá (Ruiz 2001:44-48).
Although Gaitán was liked by many, there were those who despised his views and
blamed him for all the violence that was occurring in the countryside. Every day and
every night, violence broke out in rural areas of the country as one political party raided
the other. As the population suddenly began to grow in the cities, it was obvious to
everyone the degree of violence occurring in the countryside. Politicians and other elites
heard numerous accounts of the violence but they chose to ignore it. However, this
would change on April 9, 1948, when Gaitán was assassinated in Bogotá. This event,
known as El Bogotazo, was one of the darkest days of Colombian history and recorded as
the greatest riot in the Western Hemisphere (Ruiz 2001: 55).
During El Bogotazo, the entire city was completely destroyed. Multiple buildings
in Bogotá were ruined, including many churches that were set on fire. Fidel Castro
witnessed the riot, describing it as a state of indescribable rage with “crazed people
running…with an indescribable fear in their eyes” (Cited in Ruiz 2001:56). Due to the
chaos, Castro later fled to the Cuban embassy.
Later that night, the rain was heavy, and the fires began to go out. In spite of the
rain which was preventing the entire city from burning to the ground, violence spread
throughout the country and continued for the next ten years (Ruiz 2001:55-56).
La Violencia Continues
As a result of Ospina’s intimidation tactics and the events that occurred during El
Bogotazo, no one ran for the Liberal party in the 1950 elections. Therefore, Conservative
candidate Loreano Gómez was elected president. Gómez ruled with absolute authority
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and ran a very repressive regime. It was because of this that he was given the nickname
El Monstruo. A former priest named Walter J. Broderick recorded the terror inflicted on
Colombia by the newly-elected Gómez administration:
My eyes have seen many sights. I have seen men coming into the cities
mutilated, women raped, children flogged and wounded. I saw a man whose
tongue had been cut out, and people who were lashed to a tree and made to
witness the cruel scene told me that the policemen yelled as they cut out his
tongue: You won’t be giving any more cheers for the Liberal party, you bastard!
They cut genitals off other men so they wouldn’t procreate any more
Liberals…And I know men who where held bound while policemen and
conservative civilians took it in turns to rape their wives and daughters.
Everything was carried out according to a preconceive plan of extermination.
And the victims of these bloodthirsty policemen were poor, humble country
people who were members of the Liberal party. Their wives, their old folk and
their children where shot in the full light of day (Quoted in Ruiz 2001).
In response to the violence inflicted on them, Liberals began to organize in hopes
of defending themselves against the Conservatives. Guerrilla bands were being formed
to provide protection and harassed authorities and other Conservatives in power (Bailey
1967:566). During this time, the rise in guerrilla groups reflected the need for protection.
However, guerrilla groups would later turn from their responsibilities and pursue other
objectives that would have devastating consequences.
In 1953, after stepping aside due to illness, Goméz was replaced by a military
coup that hoped to end the country’s chaos. General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, head of the
armed forces, came aboard to end the violence. The decision to allow the military to
have authority was part of conservative strategy. They wanted to use the military to calm
the violence and then to regain power after peace had been restored (Sarmiento 1997:23). Pinilla’s initial success helped him gain popularity and as a result, the national
assembly elected him to a full four-year presidential term in 1954. However, his inability
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to end la violencia led to a nationwide general strike, and by 1957, Rojas Pinilla was on
his way out (Brauer 2004:454).
The National Front
With the help of society, political leadership overthrew Pinilla and sent him into
exile. In place of Pinilla, a temporary military junta assumed power. In 1958, an effort
was made by both parties to curb the political violence. As a result, the Liberal and
Conservative parties agreed to amend the constitution and to alternate the presidency
every four years. The two parties shared all bureaucratic and legislative positions until
1974 (Von Der Walde 2001:1). This agreement, known as the National Front, brought an
end to the period known as la violencia. Although la violencia concluded, the overall
situation in Colombia remained the same. Upon analyzing this time period, Daniel
Pécaut observes:
La Violencia begins with the will to maintain or reestablish the political order, it
proceeds with a combination of offensive and defensive strategies, it concludes
leaving an apparently unchanged landscape, created for the same social structures,
the same partisan allegiances, the same precarious central state…Everything goes
on as if nothing had happened…communicating the feeling of a mere interruption
of the ordinary course of the oligarchic democracy. Such is the conviction of the
socio-economic elite… (Cited in Garcés 2005:5).
La violencia may have technically concluded, but its effects were still fresh in the minds
of everyone. Not much had changed. The violence had not ceased and the Colombian
government could still not battle opposition.
Although the Liberal and Conservative parties both approved the National Front,
neither party wanted to lose power to the other party or to the military. In addition, those
Colombians who did not feel represented by the National Front, predominantly the poor,
became extremely frustrated with the newly-designed agreement that favored the elite
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and reinforced inequality.

The combination of governmental repression, a lack of

political and electoral democracy, and extreme poverty, led to the formation of a violent
guerrilla movement during the 1970s and 1980s. These groups primarily consisted of
individuals who thought they could change the economic and social situation with the use
of outright violence (Sarmiento 1997:2). Overall, the National Front was not considered
successful in ending violence in Colombia; instead, one could say that it provoked even
more division within the nation, in turn causing more problems and potential for future
violence.
Guerrilla Groups and Drug Activity Popularize
As previously mentioned, guerrilla groups originally emerged in response to the
economic and political situation within Colombia.

Illegally-armed groups began to

appear in areas of the Andes which were geographically difficult for the government to
control. In 1966, communist and common liberals came together to formally establish
the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). Shortly thereafter, the
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) emerged with pro-Castro, Cuban-style ideology
(Von Der Walde 2001:2). During this time, several other groups were formed, such as
the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), influenced by Maoist philosophy, and the People’s
United Front, lead by Camilo Torres (Von Der Walde 2001:2).
During the 1970s even more guerrilla groups surfaced. These groups included an
urban guerrilla group called the M-19, an indigenous guerrilla group, Quintin Lame, the
Worker’s Self Defense (ADO), and the Worker’s Revolutionary Party (PRT) (Watson
1990:2-3).
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The 1970s not only marked a turning point in guerrilla activity, but also in illegal
drug activity. In the 1970s, Colombia became known as one of the major producers of
cannabis. Production of cannabis would begin to decrease over the years, but would be
replaced by other illegal drugs, such as cocaine, opium, and heroin (UNODC 2003:2).
As drugs and guerillas increasingly emerged, revolutionary activity was bound to occur.
For example, in 1979 the M-19 guerrilla groups seized the embassy of the Dominican
Republic in Bogotá and held thirteen ambassadors hostage. Terrorist attacks such as this
became commonplace.
In response to the violence, President Belisario Betancur Cuartas initiated a peace
process and entered a ceasefire with the guerrillas in 1982. He offered a general amnesty
plan for all armed guerrillas that would turn themselves in. Although the peace process
brought about some success to end guerrilla activity, by the end of the 1980s, terrorist
attacks had escalated. Three presidential candidates had been murdered along with
eleven Supreme Court justices. Also, “more than 2,000 militants of one political party,
many of whom were former guerrillas, were systematically murdered” (Sarmiento
1997:5). Journalists, judges, ministers, an attorney general, soldiers, policemen, and
thousands of citizens perished due to the wave of violence in Colombia. Ironically,
despite these violent guerrilla actions, illegal guerrilla groups received support from
religious leaders who were fed up with the government’s inability to increase the quality
of life for the Colombian people (Sarmiento 1997:3).
Guerilla groups were not the only threat to the Colombian people and the state. In
fact, a 1964 civil defense law allowed Colombian defense units to rise up and help the
Colombian military battle the guerrillas.

These groups, called paramilitares, were
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composed of private security forces funded by landowners and businessmen. These
groups initially sided with the Colombian armed forces and even received financial
support for their help. However, soon after they began to organize, the Colombian
government ceased to formally work with them and even labeled the groups as “illegally
armed forces.”

Over time, paramilitary groups came together under an umbrella

organization called the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). The AUC would later
be guilty of carrying out large-scale massacres of defenseless peasants, creating death
squads, and becoming highly involved in the drug trade (Rabasa 2001:53-56).
By the mid-1980s, Colombia was completely divided and violence was at an all
time high. Murders and desaparecidos were the outcome of a lack of security in rural
and urban areas. Along with an increase of violence, there was a heightened concern
regarding insurgencies that were supported by Cuba. More importantly, drug trafficking
had surfaced and was steadily becoming more of a problem. Division among the nation
resulted in a weak state and a powerless military (Sarmiento 1997:5).
By the late 1980s and early 1990s peace agreements led some groups such as the
EPL, PRT, M-19, and Quintín Lame to lay down their arms and stop the majority of their
violence. Although certain guerrilla groups disarmed and reintegrated into society, other
groups grew in number. At this point in history, guerrilla groups no longer existed to
protect the people from the government, instead, they exploited civilians who owned
large amounts of land and kidnapped relatives of wealthy businessmen in return for
ransom money. In addition to ransom money, guerrillas began to develop ties to the drug
trade and charged narco-traffickers for the protection they provided. As these ties to the
drug trade increased, so did the number of guerrilla members and the power they wielded.
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Drug money would become an essential part of the livelihood of their organizations and
would give them the boost they needed to threaten the entire state (Garcés 2005:8).
Guerrilla Activity in Recent Years
Today, due to their ability to organize and generate finances, three groups still
influence the ongoing civil conflict in Colombia. These organizations include Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN),
and the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). These groups have been responsible
for multiple terrorist attacks on innocent civilians, political figures, and even Colombia’s
infrastructure. They are also responsible for nearly all kidnappings and “desaparecidos”
throughout Colombia (Simons 2003:2).
The most influential and powerful guerilla organization is the FARC. The
FARC expanded slowly between the mid-1960s and 1980s. In the beginning, the FARC
guerillas ambushed military units and raided farms to capture equipment. In 1969, the
FARC continued to expand, establishing seven different fronts—that is a geographic
jurisdiction that contains specific areas of operation. Each jurisdiction contains “combat,
support, and infrastructure elements” (Rabasa 2001:24-26). At the core of the front is the
combat unit, consisting of a few hundred people. Besides the combat units, there are
logistics commissions, intelligence commissions, public order commissions, and mass
work commissions—all staffed by militia members (Rabasa 2001:26).
Over time, fronts continued to evolve throughout the country. The FARC grew
from 350 fighters in 1966 to approximately 20,000 in 2000 (Rabasa 2001:26-27). This
rapid growth can be attributed to ties with the drug trade. Today, FARC is the most
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influential and powerful guerrilla group in Colombia, as they have militia members
located throughout the country in every social sector (Rabasa 2001:27).
Another organization that is still a threat to Colombian society is the ELN,
formally founded in 1964. The ELN was initially composed of students and graduates of
the University of Santander. Their initial operations were small and generally ineffective.
This was due to their inability to organize, in addition to a division in ideology. In the
late 1960s, the army received enough information regarding ELN members, to capture or
kill many of its members, nearly resulting in the organization’s downfall. However, in
the 1980s the ELN reemerged under the leadership of Manuel Pérez. Its numbers grew
from 800 in 1986 to 3,000 in 1996. By 2000, the ELN had an estimated 5,000 members.
The ELN, although focused on influencing the Colombian oil industry, often encounters
conflict over territory with the FARC and paramilitary organizations—conflict that
usually results in violence (Rabasa 2001:30-31).
Finally, the paramilitaries or AUC have been a major ingredient in the overall
problem of violence in Colombia.

In the 1980s, links were established between

paramilitary organizations and various crime related activity, including drug-trafficking.
Initially, the paramilitaries were not as powerful as the FARC or ELN, due to their
inability to effectively organize. However, over time, many paramilitary self-defense
groups assembled under one umbrella organization called the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas
de Colombia). This gave them more organization and more influence. Strategies of the
AUC were very similar to those of the guerrillas. Its main objective was to destroy the
existing control of drug-producing areas where guerilla groups were so prevalent. During
the late 1990s, it was estimated that the AUC had approximately 8,000 fighters.
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Colombia also had many other self-defense groups that were not associated with the
AUC, but still threatened the country’s stability. Together, they were responsible for
many reported executions of guerilla sympathizers and mass killings in villages that
allegedly assist guerilla groups (Rabasa 2001:53-56).
Today, there has been significant success in negotiating with the AUC. The AUC
has begun a demobilization process and is increasingly laying down arms. Members
have stated that with the increase in Colombia’s armed forces and military activity, their
efforts may no longer be necessary. However, AUC leader Carlos Castano recently
claimed that 70% of the AUC’s funding comes from the drug trade. Therefore, even as
the AUC participates in the demobilization process, its ties to the drug trade have
remained unchanged.
There are various ways in which the guerrilla organizations and the paramilitary
groups fund their activity. Before the drug trade surfaced, the guerrilla groups made most
of their income from kidnappings and “revolutionary taxes.” Kidnappings also occur
today, and still serve as one of the major sources of revenue for both the FARC and the
ELN. In the first half of 2000, for example, 1,559 people were kidnapped, including 126
children. The majority of the victims were cattle ranchers, farmers, and merchants that
lived in the countryside. However, kidnappings are also a concern for those that live in
cities. This is especially true for business people who are often targeted and fall victim to
this profit-motivated crime. Typically, successful businessmen or landowners are most
vulnerable because they have exactly what guerillas need—land and money (Rabasa
2001:32-33).
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Although kidnappings are predominantly used to generate ransom money, they
are also used for propaganda purposes—to intimidate political and civil leaders. Lowlevel political figures, such as mayors, are especially susceptible to this threat. In fact,
there have been some cases in which guerrillas have taken control over local
governments and have used local money to fund their own guerrilla operations (Rabasa
2001:32-33).
Currently however, the most efficient way for guerrillas to fund their
organizations is through drug-related activity. Drug-traffickers use several different ways
and routes to grow, process, and export illegal drugs. They also operate via the internet
and cellular phones, using the newest technology available. Traffickers need protection
and arms. This is where the link is made between drug trafficking and guerrilla groups.
Guerrillas are given large sums of drug money in exchange for protection and other
services. For example, the FARC has a precise schedule of fees. In 1999, FARC fees in
(U.S. dollars) were as follows: production of basic paste, $15.70 per kilo; chlorhydrate of
cocaine, $52.60 per kilo; protection of laboratories, $5,263 each; protection of coca
fields, $52.60 per hectare; protection of poppy fields, $4,210 per hectare; security of
landing strips, $2,631 each; cocaine shipments, $10.50 per kilo; river transportation of
precursor chemicals, 20% of shipment value; international drug flights, $5,263 each; and
domestic drug flights, $2,631 each (Rabasa 2001:32-33).
Although the FARC is most predominantly involved with trafficking, the ELN
and the AUC have also been linked to drug activity. In March 2000, the Colombian
armed forces released numbers that demonstrate drug activity among all groups. Out of
61 total FARC units, 32 were linked to the drug trade; out of 41 total ELN units, 7 were
40

linked to the drug trade; and out of 19 AUC units, 8 were linked to the drug trade (Rabasa
2001:33).

Overall, guerrilla participation with the illegal drug trade has hurt the

Colombian people, weakened the state, and has hindered Colombian foreign relations—at
times, even with the United States.

Due to Colombia’s history of violence and drugs, it

has continued to receive foreign assistance in order to assist in the stability of the country.
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5. Past Foreign Assistance and Colombia
International Influences
During the 1960s and 1970s, Colombia was one of the major Latin American
recipients of international foreign aid from organizations such as USAID, the World
Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (Cassen 1994:252).

International

assistance programs designed to improve the social and economic development of
Colombia seemed to have a significant impact on the country’s employment rate, poverty
level, and overall growth.

The majority of assistance went to build infrastructure,

improve agriculture, and expand educational opportunities. Foreign assistance seemed to
improve the standards of living for many poor Colombians. As a result, Colombia was
considered a success story and “showcase” for the Alliance for Progress program during
its time (Cassen 1994:253).
Just as Colombia was showing great signs of economic improvement, its economy
suffered from the economic recession and debt crisis that affected all of Latin America in
the early 1980s.

Although Colombia’s economy suffered because of the recession,

compared to other Latin American countries, Colombia was considered economically
stable as it averaged annual growth rates around 3.3 percent of the gross domestic
product going into the 1990s (Aviles 2001:36).
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Colombia During the 1980s and 1990s
Although Colombia had received economic assistance from organizations such as
USAID and the World Bank, beginning with the 1980s, the United States would begin to
increase its distribution of military assistance to Colombia as the drug trade became more
popular. By the mid 1980s, concerns regarding Colombia’s influence on the U.S. drug
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problem were at the forefront of the media, and drug abuse was evolving into one of the
largest areas of concern for the general public. In fact, a New York Times poll published
in 1988 reported that 48 percent of the U.S. public thought that the drug war was the most
difficult challenge that the United States was facing in post-Cold War policy (Crandall
2001:98).
U.S. President H.W. George Bush recognized the heightening concerns of the
public and began to explore the most efficient way to address this ‘drug problem.’
However, in August 1989, Colombia’s Liberal party presidential candidate, Luis Carlos
Galán was assassinated. His killing opened the eyes of U.S. government officials to the
severity of Colombia’s problems. As a result of his death, the United States sent an
additional $65 million in counter-narcotics assistance to Colombia, almost six times the
original amount allotted for 1989 (Crandall 2001:101).
A month later, President Bush announced a $2.2 billion foreign assistance plan
designed to increase eradication and interdiction efforts in the Andes—specifically
targeting Colombia. This initiative made the Andes the leading recipient of U.S. military
assistance in the Western Hemisphere; however, in 1990 the United States turned its
attention from the drug war and focused on the Persian Gulf War. In addition, in 1993
President Clinton reduced anti-narcotics assistance both domestically and internationally.
However, his attempt to decrease funding would not last long. In 1994 after mid-term
elections, the Republican party took over Congress—thus turning its attention back onto
anti-narcotics efforts. Specifically, the United States gradually became obsessed with
Colombia’s drug problem due to the newly elected Colombian president, Ernesto Samper
(1994-1998). Due to his ties to multiple drug cartels, Samper lost all credibility and
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respect from the United States. During his time as president, Samper established one of
the most abrasive U.S.-Colombian relationships in U.S.-Latin American history (Crandall
2001:101).
President Pastrana
The election of President Andrés Pastrana in 1998 created an opportunity for
productive U.S.-Colombian dialogue to be restored. Pastrana entered office anxious to
move forward in the peace process and appeared to be very dedicated to playing the role
of peacemaker; he seemed especially eager to enter into peace negotiations with guerrilla
groups. For example, in 1997, he offered the FARC a “distension zone” which consisted
of 42,000 km2 of land. The United States supported Pastrana’s efforts, and initiated
further peace discussions between United States officials and FARC officials in Costa
Rica.

Although Pastrana’s intentions to negotiate with FARC were legitimate, his

decision to give them their own territory was a huge mistake. The FARC instantly turned
the area into a mini-state and created its own justice system, infrastructure, and school
system. In addition, the FARC began training approximately 18,000 guerillas in this
area. The FARC was building its own army, and peace negotiations were going nowhere
(UNODC 2003:6-7).
Since negotiations remained stagnant, the Pastrana administration decided to take
the land back. In February, the armed forces seized land previously given to the FARC,
and the guerrillas were forced to flee to rural areas which they had previously lived.
Shortly after the FARC’s retrieval from the “distension zone,” an increase of terrorist
attacks—such as bombings and assassinations—began to break out not only against the
Colombian people, but also against the U.S. citizens living in Colombia. For instance, in
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1999, the FARC deliberately murdered three American indigenous-rights activists who
lived in Colombia. This ended any additional discussion between the United States and
FARC, and gave U.S. officials a first-hand look at what Colombians had endured for
decades (Sweig 2002:1).
After struggling to fight the rich, powerful, guerrilla organizations, Pastrana
turned to the United States for assistance. As a result, in 2000, the United States would
become a major actor, in conjunction with Colombian officials, in the battle to win the
“war on drugs” (Sarmiento 1997:6).
Pastrana had about as much success negotiating peace with the FARC as the
United States had, and his peace efforts would continue to flounder in the midst of civil
turmoil (Ruiz 2001:226). The people, sick and tired of all the bloodshed, flooded the
streets of Colombia. On Sunday, October 24, 1999, wearing white shirts with green
ribbons, Colombians protested by waving white flags in the air and screaming “No Más”
(or “No More”). The people longed for the kidnappings, murders, and massacres to end.
The protest aired on every news station in Colombia, as approximately six million
people, in seventeen different cities across the nation, took part. Protesters believed that
this was the only way they could pressure the government to do something about the
violence. As a result, thirteen governmental officials and twelve FARC delegates began
reviewing a 12 point negotiation program. The program called for the “disarmament of
the guerrillas in return for sweeping reforms to ease poverty, redistribute land to peasants
and combat political corruption” (Ruiz 2001:228). The FARC threw in a few stipulations
of its own, demanding governmental armed forces be withdrawn from the southern
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border of Ecuador all the way north to Bogotá. The government was not about hand over
such territory. Therefore, no such concession was made (Ruiz 2001: 227-228).
Although Pastrana seemed devoted the peace, there was little hope that he would
reach any type of peace agreement with the FARC. Those assumptions were correct. On
November 2, when negotiations were scheduled to resume, FARC representatives failed
to even show up. This reflected poorly on Pastrana, because it showed the lack of respect
the FARC had for him and his administration. Local polls showed that close to 80
percent of Colombians believed Pastrana was not dealing with the peace negotiations
properly. Pastrana felt he had no choice but to turn to foreign troops for help. Many of
the top businessmen agreed with Pastrana, and believed this was the only way to stop the
guerrillas. Others disagreed and wore shirts that said “No More Gringo Military.” This
was a direct commentary on the U.S. military aid already being used by the Colombian
government in an attempt to decrease narcotics-trafficking (Ruiz 2001: 228-229).
At this point, the United States had heightened concerns regarding the problems
in Colombia. The lack of cooperation from the FARC alarmed the U.S., and caused its
officials to consider increasing involvement in Colombia. Secretary of State, Madeleine
Albright, for one, explained how the guerrilla groups were funding their operations with
drug money, and how this problem was affecting many other nations. She concluded that
“Colombia’s people are engaged in a vital test of democracy…they should know that we
understand the many dimensions and long-term nature of the problems they face, and that
we will do all we can to help them” (Ruiz 2001:228-229). Many agreed with Albright
and were concerned that Colombia was losing the battle to the guerrillas. Others saw the
need for more assistance to Colombia to fight the drug war. For instance, Indiana
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Representative, Dan Burton stated, “This is our war as much as Colombia’s War…The
billions we’re talking about for dealing with the drug problem down there is not enough”
(Ruiz 2001: 230). Dennis Hastert of Illinois declared, “I think the oldest democracy in
the Southern Hemisphere is in great jeopardy…I’m concerned about Colombia because
of the implications it has for our kids…the heroin and cocaine that comes into our
country” (Ruiz 2001:232).
Although there were many who agreed with these politicians, there were others
who believed further involvement in Colombia would be a disaster. One senior official,
who once worked in Colombia, and who disagreed with any further U.S. involvement
stated that, “It (the situation in Colombia) is going to be a very dangerous mess…and we
(the United States) are going to be in the middle of that mess” (Ruiz 2001: 229).
In September 1999, Pastrana made a visit to the United States, on behalf of
Colombia, to ask for an increase in aid. He requested $3.5 billion over a three year
period, in the form of military equipment, technical support, and intelligence assistance.
Democrats insisted that Pastrana improve the human rights situation in Colombia before
receiving more aid from the United States. Pastrana pleaded with the United States to
eliminate restraints on aid because of Colombia’s human rights record. He claimed that
Colombia’s poor human rights record was due to the impact of the existing guerrilla
organizations, which he needed assistance in combating.
Despite strong reservations, Congress began examining a new aid package
proposed by Republican Senators Paul Coverdell and Mike DeWine. This package
allotted for $1.5 billion over a three year period, with $540 million for helicopters and
other equipment, $405 million to enhance drug interdiction, $120 million to develop
47

alternative opportunities to grow drug crops in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, and $70
million to strengthen democracy and human rights. Pastrana was pleased with this
package, but despite his approval, there was too much debate within the Congress, and
the package did not pass (Ruiz 2001:233-234).
Albright called Pastrana soon thereafter to reassure him that the United States had
not betrayed him. She guaranteed that President Clinton would ask Congress to increase
aid early the next year. Meanwhile, Pastrana’s job as president was becoming more
difficult. Amnesty International testified that they would oppose any additional military
aid to Colombia. The organization saw no improvement in Colombia’s horrific human
rights record despite the fact that Colombia was already receiving aid from the United
States. Susan Lee, Amnesty’s researcher on Colombia found shocking evidence of poor
human rights records when she visited that country. She observed that “killings have
been conducted with chain saws, victims have been dismembered alive…There are
reports of paramilitaries playing football with victims’ heads” (Ruiz 2001:235).
Not only did it seem that Pastrana was losing international support, but two of his
top generals, Fernando Tapias and Jorge Mora, resigned in November. Both men were
frustrated with the United States and did not believe Pastrana and Ricardo (Pastrana’s
right hand man), were being dynamic enough. Tapias and Mora wanted Ricardo out of
the picture, but Pastrana could not consent. Pastrana and Ricardo were controlling the
peace process and if Ricardo was fired, it would appear that Pastrana was ending the
peace process. Luckily, in the end, Pastrana refused to accept Tapias’ and Mora’s
resignation, and talked them into staying on board. In return, Pastrana “abandoned the
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language of a peacemaker and adopted a more bellicose tone” to appease them (Ruiz
2001:237).
Plan Colombia
In December 1999, violence in Colombia reached new heights.

Year end

statistics in 1999 reflected the increase in violence and total chaos. A total of 1,863
Colombians were massacred and approximately 90 percent of all crimes went
unpunished. Colombia was in desperate need of help and Pastrana knew it. He began
designing a five-year plan, one intended to assist development, rebuild the judiciary, and
implement crop substitution and coca eradication. Also, the plan aimed at assisting
people who had been displaced from their homes. More specifically, objectives included
the following: support for human rights and judicial reform, the expansion of counternarcotics operations in southern Colombia (in the form of helicopters, humanitarian
assistance, and developmental assistance), an increase in alternative economic
development for Colombia, Bolivia, and Ecuador, increased interdiction efforts, and
assistance for the Colombian police.
Pastrana called this “Plan Colombia,” and once again turned to the United States
for assistance. Beyond that, he also looked to Europe and the international community
for help. The original five-year plan called for a total contribution of $7.5 billion, with
$4 billion provided by Colombia, $1.3 billion provided by the United States, and the rest
provided by Europe (Marcella 2003:19).
Plan Colombia was heavily-debated and controversial from the beginning.
Congressmen were concerned that the United States was getting in over its head, and
many were concerned that the United States could not have a significant impact in
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Colombia without getting deeply involved in that country’s ongoing civil war.

In

addition, there were still concerns about Colombia’s human rights violations and its ties
with illegal armed forces.
Overall, Congress did not feel that Colombia’s human rights record should be
overlooked (Sweig 2002: 3-9). Those who did not want to support Plan Colombia also
saw parallels to the Vietnam War.

They believed assistance would provoke more

violence and would increase refugee flows. There were even concerns as to techniques
related to assisting Colombia in this war on drugs—especially regarding herbicide
fumigation. This particular controversy centered on the health of those exposed to the
herbicides, as “aerial eradication (had) caused eye, respirator, skin, and digestive
ailments” (Morris 2001:1-3).
Colombia’s ambassador was one of the major, influential people in the process
of lobbying U.S. officials for aid. Luis Alberto Moreno met with hundreds of members
of Congress, and he expressed, in detail, the need for assistance and the good intentions
of its rulers. Further, as Sweig notes, “Bogotá also brought dozens of U.S. legislators and
their staffs to Colombia for carefully packaged tours. Embassy officials worked in the
halls of the U.S. executive branch, toured the salons of Washington think tanks, and
crisscrossed party lines” (Sweig 2002:1).
In 2000, Congress waived Colombia’s human rights requirement, and allotted
$1.3 billion towards Plan Colombia, with two-thirds of the money set aside for military
purchases (McLean 2002: 133). The United States was adamant about its commitment to
counter-narcotics operations, force protection, and eradication of coca fields, lab
destruction, and if necessary, humanitarian assistance (Marcella 2003:19-20). In addition
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to providing helicopters and other equipment, intelligence and other military assistance,
Plan Colombia included training by U.S. special forces (Economist 2003:1). Congress,
aware of Colombia’s poor human rights record and ties with guerrilla groups, insisted
that all Colombians trained by U.S. officials have a clear understanding of the
expectations regarding human rights standards. The United States also granted Colombia
electronic surveillance equipment, which enabled the latter to keep an eye on the
relationship between paramilitaries and the Colombian military (Sweig 2003:1).
Although the United States agreed to partner in Plan Colombia, Pastrana did not
receive the international support he wanted. Most Europeans refused to contribute to
Plan Colombia, as they were unwilling to ignore the country’s terrible human rights
record. Beyond that, many in the international community declined the opportunity to
take part in Plan Colombia because they perceived the plan’s approach as geared more
toward improving the military—instead of toward precipitating social reform (Falcoff
2002:2). However, despite the lack of support internationally, Pastrana was pleased. He
knew that the support he received from the United States would be a great start towards
achieving his objectives (Ruiz 2001: 248).
Although Pastrana was excited about U.S. help, not everyone was thrilled about
the aid Colombia was receiving—especially Colombian locals involved in the drug trade.
After being informed of Congress’ decision to cooperate with Plan Colombia, Sureshot,
the leader of FARC, expressed his views on U.S. intervention:
What we have here is hunger, misery and exploitation and that’s not going to end
with rifles, machine guns or bombs. I think the ones who came up with this [aid]
agreement have committed a grave error. The problems here are social order, it’s
not a problem of weaponry. The FARC disagrees with this aid from the U.S.
because assistance should be for social spending and peace, not for increasing the
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conflict with the blessing of the few who directly benefit from the war. We can
be attacked by the security forces when the President considers it convenient since
we are an organization that has taken up arms against the state. But it’s wrong
that they should do this with the participation of the U.S., under the slanderous
pretext that we have links to the drug trade (Ruiz 2001: 248).
It was obvious, Sureshot realized, that the FARC was the number one target of the
Colombian military, and now the military had major support from the United States—
whose government had evidence of FARC members guarding illegal crops, providing
security for drug labs, and engaging in other activity to aid in the drug trade. (According
to the DEA, for example, the FARC generated a large financial alliance with the drug
trade that generated about $2 million a day). Although the FARC tried to downplay its
illegal activity and to create the illusion that it represented the best interests of poor
Colombians, everyone knew better, especially the U.S. government (Ruiz 2001: 248).
The demolition of the FARC organization has been, and will continue to be the primary
target of the Colombian-U.S. initiative.
The Impact of September 11, 2001
While Plan Colombia was operating in its second year, the international
community was sidetracked by the events of September 11, 2001. These events would
drastically impact U.S. international policy, and more specifically, would affect U.S.
policy toward Colombia. Primarily, after 9/11, the U.S. shifted its priority from counternarcotics to counterterrorism. However, this did not let guerrilla groups off the hook,
because the FARC, the ELN, and the AUC already appeared on the U.S. State
Department’s list of terrorist organizations. Although none of the groups had all the
characteristics of a classical international terrorist organization, and though Colombia
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was never formally made part of the global ‘war on terror,’ guerrilla organizations in
Colombia were now targeted more than they had ever been (Cope 2002:3).
However, this subtle shift in their U.S. classification (which went from describing
them as narcotics groups to terrorist groups) did not stop guerrilla organizations from
continuing their horrific crimes. As a result, Pastrana offered one last effort to negotiate
peace in Colombia with the FARC. No agreement ensued, and a month later, the FARC
conducted approximately 170 armed attacks in a thirty-day span. On February 20, 2002,
the FARC hijacked a civilian aircraft and kidnapped one passenger, Senator Jorge
Eduardo Gechem Turbay (Marcella 2003:21-22).

He was the head of the Senate

Commission on Peace, and a member of a large political family.
Subsequently, Pastrana formally declared that he was ending any existing peace
talks with the FARC. Days later, former senator Ingrid Betancourt was kidnapped by a
FARC column. As of February 2003, the FARC had a total of six government officials in
captivity. By this point, the FARC and the ELN were almost completely discredited at
home and abroad; assassinations, kidnappings, and attacks against civilian populations
had done nothing but turn people against them (Marcella 2003:21-22).
Alvaro Uribe
Although Pastrana stayed committed to the peace process, his efforts failed,
leaving the country in a state dominated by guerrillas. In 2002, Alvaro Uribe replaced
Pastrana as president and inherited the task of regaining control over Colombia. He
entered office determined to defeat guerrillas and paramilitaries, as well as to end
narcotics trafficking. However, immediately following his election, the FARC demanded
the resignation of all departmental, municipal, and village officials—in the hope of
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intimidating and embarrassing the Uribe administration during its early stages. As a
result, over 200 mayors resigned after receiving threats from the FARC. In addition,
many local governments became even more unstable than before his election.
It seemed as if the stronger Uribe appeared, the harder the FARC attacked,
attempting to divide the country with terrorist attacks. For example, in April 2002, the
FARC was responsible for kidnapping 12 parliamentarians in the center of Cali. One
month later, it slaughtered 119 men, women, and children seeking refuge in a church in
Quibdó.

Within the first few months of Uribe’s presidency, more than 2 million

Colombians were internally displaced. However, this would not intimidate President
Uribe (UNODC 2003:6).
In May, after its attack on the church in Quibdó, the FARC stated that it would
begin negotiations if it were to receive another “distension zone,” this one twice the size
of the previous one. Uribe responded, saying that negotiations would only proceed if
there was an immediate cease fire and all acts of violence against the population were
stopped. Consequently, to this day, no negotiations have been successful with the FARC
(Veilette 2005:7).
Although the Uribe administration has not had success with the FARC or the
ELN, as mentioned earlier, the AUC has begun a demobilization process. President
Uribe has been very persistent in carrying out his objectives, despite multiple obstacles.
The FARC’s efforts to bully Uribe have been unsuccessful, as “he is determined to
confront the political and psychological challenge to the Colombian State’s ability to
govern and control territory” (Cooper 1993:2). Uribe is committed to taking a proactive
agenda to restore authority, and therefore, increase stability and security within the
54

country. He has taken a hard line approach to negotiations. He is only willing to
negotiate with guerrilla groups who are willing to disarm and end terrorism.

This

includes the paramilitary groups with which Pastrana had refused to negotiate. He
imposed a one-time 1.2% war tax on wealthy individuals and businesses to generate
income for the military (Veilette 2005:6).
Overall, Uribe has taken steps to improve Colombia’s armed forces, which have
recently defeated guerrillas in a number of confrontations throughout the country,
according to the UNODC. By the end of 2003, armed forces were being deployed to
areas that had previously been occupied by guerrillas. Although Uribe does not have
much to show for his efforts, many believe his hard line approach, in addition to his
refusal to be intimidated by guerrilla action, has allowed him to take the necessary steps
needed to eventually improve Colombia’s overall situation (Veilette 2005:6).

The

Colombian people seem to agree; public support for Uribe continues to be high, largely
because he has promised his own citizens, not to mention government officials in the
United States that he will address his nation’s problems without giving into guerrilla
organizations (Cooper 1993:1-5).
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Colombia Continues?
With Plan Colombia still in effect, U.S. aid continues to assist Colombia in its
battle for victory in the ‘war on drugs.’ President George W. Bush has continued to
support Colombia under the Andean Counter-drug Initiative (ACI), and through his
endorsement of Plan Colombia (Veillette 2005:2).

Beyond that, in 2002, Congress

approved the use of U.S. counter narcotic funds for a unified campaign to fight drugtrafficking and organizations such as the FARC (Veillette 2005:2).

The primary
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objectives of U.S. aid to Colombia include the following: stopping the flow of illegal
drugs into the U.S., promotion of peace, and assistance in economic development—
perhaps for the underlying purpose of preserving democracy. Colombian objectives are
similar, but would emphasize increased security within its borders. Both countries’
objectives have evolved over time, shifting from an emphasis on counter-narcotics to one
of counter-terrorism. However, this shift has not been very significant, as those involved
in the drug trade and those who are listed as terrorists are largely one in the same. As
such, from FY 2000 to FY 2005, U.S. funding toward Plan Colombia has not wavered
significantly, and has totaled approximately $4.5 billion. This is noticeably more than in
has been in previous years. Furthermore, Colombia has also received military equipment,
training, and support for alternative crop development.
The Bush administration, therefore, has continued Plan Colombia—and has even
increased aid to Colombia under the Andean Counter-drug Initiative. Given that such a
large portion of aid has gone towards accomplishing goals in Colombia, it is important to
analyze the overall effect it has had. This may impact future decisions regarding aid to
Colombia.

56

6. Why Study the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid and Why Colombia?
Despite the research that indicates that foreign assistance is not effective, the
United States continues to distribute a massive amount of foreign aid to the international
community each year. Foreign assistance is an essential part of U.S. foreign policy and
continues to play a major role in U.S. foreign relations. Therefore, it is essential that
theories regarding the effectiveness of foreign aid continue to be debated and cases
continue to be studied and analyzed.

Aid organizations need to have a clear

understanding about how aid affects people, institutions, agriculture, and the poverty
level of a recipient nation. Agencies need to have a better idea of when aid is going to
work and why. This will help to eliminate future mistakes and to help increase the
efficiency of aid programs—thus helping international communities and also improving
U.S. foreign relations.
With Colombia being one of the largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid, Colombia
is an excellent country to study. Analyzing the effect that foreign assistance has had in
Colombia will help clarify the relationship aid has on growth, conflict, and drug-related
objectives. Studying the relationship between aid and growth will offer another analysis
for comparison purposes. This may clarify the importance of the geological location as
well as sample size, as Colombia is the only country being analyzed.
In addition to aid’s relationship to growth, Colombia opens the door to further
research on the relationship between aid and conflict. Lessons learned from this will give
policy makers more insight as to the most effective way to allocate aid in hostile
situations. This may be used to increase national security abroad in countries that are in
constant conflict. Studying the effect aid has had on Colombia during conflict, may also
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give insight as to if it is even possible for aid to make a difference in such a difficult
environment. This may prevent large amounts of money being used in the future for
purposes that would never yield desired results.
Studying the effectiveness of aid in Colombia will help aid agencies as well as
policy makers know when to expect aid to be effective and when it is most likely to be
ineffective.
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7. Was Foreign Aid Effective?
As mentioned above, there are many reasons why foreign aid fails when it is
distributed to international communities.

In addition to the common pitfalls which

include: trying to implement foreign aid programs in countries with poor policies and
institutions, a lack of knowledge of the culture and the region, and a lack of
communication between donor and recipient, past studies indicate other scenarios in
which aid is not expected to be effective. Although Colombia has avoided a few of these
pitfalls, over the years, it has not been able to escape them all. By understanding which
pitfalls Colombia has avoided in addition to examining past studies conducted on aid and
growth, one can better predict if aid has been effective in Colombia from 1980-2002.
One pitfall that Colombia may have avoided, has to do with its political policies.
In this case, foreign aid may be effective in Colombia, because its policies are democratic
in nature. According to Burnside and Dollar, if a county has strong domestic policies,
then aid is likely to be effective. Since Colombia’s policies are democratic, this can have
many positive effects.

For example, Colombia is one of Latin America’s oldest

democracies; as such, there are obvious connections between it and its primary foreign
aid donor––the United States. This opens the door for both countries to agree upon
similar objectives and a common philosophical language. This has been the case with
Plan Colombia.

Both countries want to preserve the Colombian democracy, and

therefore have a common goal from which to start.
Democratic policies may also give people an overall voice as to how they would
like to address specific issues in Colombia. This not only encourages Colombian citizens
to find solutions to multiple problems from within, but it gives Colombians an overall
59

feeling of unity. Optimism may increase due to the fact that Colombians have a say in
what goes on within the nation.

Therefore, with an increase in foreign assistance,

governmental officials will have more means necessary to carry out the demands of the
citizens.
Colombia’s democratic policies are expected to increase donor-recipient
communication, which may increase the likelihood that foreign assistance is effective.
However, Colombia is a weak state and therefore, the actual strength of those democratic
policies may have been effected by its continual social problems. Burnside and Dollar
only observed a positive correlation between aid and developing countries that had strong
policies. Therefore, although Colombia’s polices are democratic, the strength of those
policies is yet to be determined.
Another pitfall that Colombia avoids is that its donor does not lack knowledge in
terms of Colombia’s culture, region, or needs. Over the years the United States has kept
very close ties with Colombia. During the 1980s, when a violent guerrilla movement
emerged, the United States took an active role in attempting to negotiate peace treaties
with the leaders of prominent guerrilla groups in Colombia (Sarmiento 1997:3). This is a
good indication that the United States understood the details of Colombia’s culture,
region, and internal conflict, enough to intervene in cooperation with Colombian
officials.
We can see a more recent example of how the United States avoids this pitfall
when examining Plan Colombia. Colombian President Pastrana was the author of the
original Plan Colombia proposal during the late 1990s, when he turned to the United
States for help. Although minor changes may have been made, Colombia benefits by
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having its president as the author of the proposed document. This definitely lends
cultural awareness and sensitively to the final draft. Since the United States has had an
adequate knowledge of Colombia’s culture, region, and needs, this may increase the
chance that foreign assistance impacted Colombia in a positive way.
The last difficulty that sometimes leads to the failure of foreign aid is donorrecipient communication. In the case of Colombia, it is difficult to predict how donorrecipient communication will influence the effect of foreign assistance. Overall, U.S.Colombian relations have been fair. According to Cassen, good communication between
the United States and Colombia was one of the major reasons Colombia was considered
successful with foreign assistance in the 1970s. However, beginning in the late 1980s,
Colombia’s poor human rights record became an area of concern among the U.S.
Congress (Aviles 2001:40). Although this did not drastically hinder U.S.-Colombian
communication, there are four years included in this analysis that U.S.-Colombian
communication was devastating.
According to Russell Crandall, Colombian President Samper (1994-1998),
“deeply strained” the “bilateral relationship” (Crandall 2001:95). Although President
Pastrana was able to restore U.S.-Colombian relations during his presidency, the Samper
administration hindered U.S.-Colombian communication. In fact, Crandall claims that
U.S.-Colombian relations during the Samper administration was one of the “most
abrasive episodes in U.S.-Latin American relations since the end of the Cold War”
(Crandall 2001:96).
Since the Samper administration’s inability to communicate efficiently with the
United States hindered donor-recipient communication for about four years, it is difficult
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to predict how poor communication during this time influenced the effectiveness of
foreign aid.
Although Colombia avoids a few of these common pitfalls, there are reasons to
believe that foreign assistance has had no impact in Colombia.
institutions are incredibly weak.

First, Colombia’s

In the article, “Colombia: Failed, Failing, or Just

Weak?,” Phillip McLean outlines how the emergence of the drug trade began the decline
of Colombian institutions. As the drug trade began to surface and gain popularity in the
1980s, corruption began to weaken Colombian institutions. Corruption has been seen in
all aspects of Colombian society, from funding presidential elections to influencing local
businessmen.

It has even been visible in Colombian sports organizations (McLean

2002:127). Since Colombia’s institutions are so fragile, and its bureaucracy is so weak,
the country may not be able to distribute foreign aid in a productive manner. In addition,
if institutions have been corrupted, then money may be wasted on funding a corrupt
organization. In sum, foreign assistance to Colombia may be ineffective due to weak
institutions that are unable to distribute additional funds effectively. Similarly, foreign
assistance may have no impact due to the corruption that existed in Colombian society.
Upon analyzing the results from prior studies that test the relationship between aid
and growth, literature suggests various scenarios where foreign assistance may be
ineffective. For example, Griffin and Enos found that an increase in aid led to a decrease
in the country’s savings. This hindered the growth of the recipient country. Therefore, if
assistance to Colombia has lowered savings in Colombia, then aid may not be effective.
In addition, past studies indicate that aid is most likely to be ineffective if policies are not
strong. Although Colombia’s policies are democratic in nature, its history of violence
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and corruption may have had an impact on how strong the policies are. Colombia is a
weak democracy. This may override the fact that its policies are democratic. Therefore,
if Colombia’s policies, although democratic in nature, are not strong, then aid may have
no impact in Colombia.
Along the same lines, Peter Boon found that aid was not effective due to the fact
that foreign aid actually increased inequality. According to Boon, foreign aid does not
reach the poor, nor does it change policies which tend to favor the elite. Therefore,
foreign assistance my have no impact on Colombia if the aid does not reach those that it
is intended to help.
Finally, Burnside and Dollar discuss a common reason that foreign assistance is
not positively correlated with growth. That is, often times, donors pursue their own
interest rather than the interest of the recipient country. If this is the case with foreign
assistance to Colombia, aid is most likely to be ineffective.
Due to the fact that existing literature is split on the effectiveness of foreign aid,
and due to Colombia’s lack of bureaucracy and weak institutions, it is difficult to predict
if foreign assistance has had an impact in Colombia.

In my analysis, I test this

relationship. Even though I do not test the direct relationship between aid and growth, I
test the relationship between foreign assistance and variables representing three broad
areas that are expected to be influenced by foreign aid to Colombia because they are
explicit goals of U.S. foreign policy in the region.

Those broad areas include:

Colombia’s law enforcement, guerrilla activity, and overall drug production. Each broad
area has been a primary focus of U.S. foreign assistance over the years. Foreign aid
programs have been designed in order to increase Colombia’s law enforcement, decrease
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its guerrilla activity, and curb its overall drug production. Although programs have been
designed to address these three social issues, Colombia’s institutions are weak which has
affected the strength of its policies. Therefore, based on existing literature, I hypothesize
that, due to the fact that Colombia is a weak state and its institutions are fragile, foreign
assistance given to Colombia has had an insignificant effect on Colombia’s law
enforcement, drug activity, and overall drug production.
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8. Data and Methods
Over the years, U.S. foreign aid has been given to Colombia in order to assist the
Colombian government address its social, economic, and political problems.
Specifically, foreign aid programs have been designed to increase Colombia’s military
and law enforcement efforts in order to decrease its drug activity and provide more
security for Colombian civilians.

In addition, U.S. foreign assistance has provided

Colombia with the means necessary to fight guerrilla violence. Therefore, in order to test
the effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance in Colombia, I chose three broad areas that
reflect the overall goals of U.S. foreign assistance in Colombia. These include drugrelated law enforcement, guerrilla violence, and overall drug production.
Here I discuss the specific measures and data used to test the relationship between
foreign aid and these three areas of policy outputs. 2 As mentioned, this analysis explores
the relationship of U.S. foreign aid on three broad areas of Colombia’s society. These
broad areas include law enforcement, guerrilla violence, and drug production. Within
each broad category there are key dependent variables that are analyzed in order to
represent the broader category. For example, in order to analyze the effect foreign aid
has had on law enforcement, I look at how foreign assistance may influence the number
of drug labs destroyed in Colombia, the amount of cocaine and base seized (kilos) in
Colombia, and the amount of coca sprayed (ha) in Colombia from 1981-2001.
In order to analyze the effect foreign aid has had on guerrilla violence; I evaluate
the effect foreign assistance has had on the number of reported kidnappings (per thousand
inhabitants) in Colombia from 1990-2002, in addition to, the number of homicides (per
2

Refer to Table 2 in Appendix A for a list of all concepts, variables, and sources included in the analysis.
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thousand inhabitants) in Colombia from 1980-2002. Finally, in order to assess the effect
of foreign aid in the area of overall drug production, I test to see how foreign aid has
affected the amount of estimated cultivation of coca (ha) in Colombia from 1983-2002.
This section will discuss each variable used in detail in order to explain why each
concept is significant and how each measure is an appropriate expression of a concept.
Then, I begin my analysis by charting each key dependent variable and making
comparisons between changes in these variables and the flow of U.S. foreign aid to
Colombia from 1980-2002.

Finally, I conduct multivariate time-series analysis to

explore the relationship that foreign assistance has had on each dependent variable.
Dependent Variables
As previously mentioned, there are three key dependent variables used in my
analysis to test the effect that foreign assistance has had on Colombia’s law
enforcement. 3 All three variables were found via the Policía Nacional de Colombia
website. This is an informational website maintained by the Colombian government
itself. Also, data located here, was the one of the only sources available that provided the
information needed—especially data measuring kidnappings and homicides. The first
key dependent variable used in my analysis to test the effect that foreign aid has had on
law enforcement is the number of drug labs destroyed in Colombia from 1981-2001. As
mentioned earlier, Colombia has been involved in the drug trade since the 1970s. In the
1980s, Colombia’s role as the main drug processor set it apart from other countries in the
Andean region (UNODC 2003:2). Although Colombia cultivates and processes its own
drugs, coca is often times imported to Colombia in order to be processed, and then
3

A list of all dependent variables is located in Table 2 of Appendix A.
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exported to the United States and Europe (UNODC 2003:2). By analyzing how many
drug labs have been destroyed over time by Colombian police, one can better assess the
effect that foreign assistance has had in assisting Colombian law enforcement in the
detection and destruction of drug labs. If there is a positive correlation between the
amount of foreign aid given to Colombia and the number of drug labs destroyed in
Colombia, then one can assume that foreign assistance to Colombia has helped law
enforcement fight the war on drugs.
The second variable used to examine the impact that foreign assistance has had on
law enforcement is the amount of cocaine and base seized (kilos) in Colombia from 19812001. Approximately 90 percent of the world’s cocaine industry originates in, or passes
through, Colombia (Veilette 2005:3). Although a few major drug cartels have been taken
down over the years, Colombia still plays a major role in the exporting and trafficking of
illegal drugs (UNODC 2003:15). Therefore, testing the relationship between the amount
of cocaine and base seized by the Colombian police and the amount of foreign assistance
given to Colombia, will clarify the effect that foreign assistance has on the Colombian
police’s ability to decrease Colombia’s drug flow. If there is a positive correlation
between the amount of cocaine and base seized and the amount of foreign assistance
given to Colombia over time, then one can assume that foreign aid to Colombia has
helped assist Colombian police improve interdiction efforts.
The third variable I use to determine the effect that foreign aid has had on
Colombia’s law enforcement is the amount of coca sprayed (ha) in Colombia from 19812001. In the 1990s, Colombia became the world’s largest grower of the coca leaf (70
percent of the world’s harvest). Most of the coca growing in Colombia is located in areas
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under the control of guerrilla groups and therefore, very difficult to address. One way in
which Colombian officials tried to curb the cultivation was through aerial fumigation.
This allowed Colombian law enforcement to spray illegal coca crops from airplanes—
thus, discouraging the cultivation of illegal crops. Although today aerial fumigation is
highly debated and currently suspended in Colombia, for the past ten years it has been
used by Colombian law enforcement as a primary way to deter coca cultivation. In the
past few years, the United States has increased support for aerial fumigation by providing
aircrafts needed to spray the land (Veilette 2005:14). By testing to see how aerial
fumigation has changed over time with respect to the amount of foreign assistance
Colombia has received, one can better understand the impact that foreign assistance has
had in assisting Colombian law enforcement in meeting its objectives of reducing
cultivation of coca. If there is a positive relationship between the amount of coca sprayed
and the amount of foreign assistance given to Colombia, one can assume that foreign
assistance helped Colombia’s law enforcement officials decrease cultivation by spraying
more coca crops.
I use two key dependent variables to assess the impact foreign assistance has had
on guerrilla violence. The first is a change in the number of reported kidnappings (per
thousand inhabitants) in Colombia from 1990-2002. This data can be obtained from the
Policía Nacional de Colombia website. 4
Colombia.

Kidnappings are a common occurrence in

In fact, Colombia has the highest number of kidnappings in the world

(UNODC 2003:28). Those who have a substantial amount of land, money, or power,

4

Data on reported kidnappings was obtained by the Policía Nacional, a government run program to
enhance protection throughout Colombia.
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along with their family members, are common targets for kidnappers.

The reason

kidnappings are so prevalent in Colombia’s society is because of the large guerilla
organizations (Rabasa 2001:45). Ransom money collected from kidnappings is a primary
source of income for guerrilla groups (UNODC 2003:28).

Therefore, in order to

understand the impact that foreign assistance has had on guerrilla violence, I test the
impact that foreign assistance has on the number of reported kidnappings in Colombia
from 1990-2002. If there is a statistically significant relationship between the amount of
foreign assistance in Colombia, and the number of reported kidnappings, one can better
understand the impact that foreign assistance has on Colombia’s ability to provide
protection for the average civilian. Specifically, if there is a relationship in the expected
direction, then the amount of foreign assistance given to Colombia should increase
protection throughout Colombia—therefore, decreasing the number of reported
kidnappings. In sum, decreases in the number of kidnappings reported indicate a decline
of overall guerrilla violence in Colombia, making kidnapping an appropriate mean of
operationalizing the concept of guerrilla activity.
Although the number of kidnappings are a good indication of the level of guerilla
violence in Colombia, one should keep in mind that, often times, kidnappings are not
reported out of fear of what could happen if the incident is reported to Colombian police
(UNODC 2003:28). Such under-reporting may serve to weaken the accuracy of the data.
Although it seems to be a reasonable assumption that under-reporting would represent a
fairly consistent proportion of total kidnapping in the country. Therefore, analyzing the
level of kidnappings may not be appropriate, but since the emphasis here is on changes in
kidnappings over time, under-reporting should not seriously undermine the validity of the
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analysis.

A potentially more serious problem with the data is that the kidnapping

statistics are only available for the twelve-year period of 1990-2002. This small number
of cases will make it difficult to find any significant effects of aid on this dependent
variable.
In addition to kidnappings, another variable that is an appropriate indication of the
amount of guerrilla violence in Colombia is a change in the number of homicides (per
thousand inhabitants) from 1980-2002. This data can also be obtained from the Policía
Nacional de Colombia website. 5 Over the years, guerillas have been responsible for the
death of many innocent lives. In the past, guerrillas and paramilitaries have even been
responsible for wiping out entire villages in the rural areas of Colombia. In addition to
various massacres carried out by illegally armed groups, guerrillas have murdered many
other Colombian civilians, especially those involved in the government (UNODC
2003:25).
According to the UNODC, there is a direct relationship between drug-trafficking
and homicides.

During the early 1990s, when drug-trafficking was at its peak,

Colombia’s homicide rate also peaked, and when major drug cartels were dismantled,
there was a drop in the homicide rate (UNODC 2003:26). Therefore, I evaluate the
change in Colombia’s homicide rate, and compare it to the amount of U.S. foreign
assistance given to Colombia from 1980-2002. If Colombia’s homicide rate increases or
decreases due to the amount of foreign assistance given to Colombia, one can assess the
effect that foreign assistance has had on guerrilla violence. If the number of homicides

5

The Policía Nacional is likely to have the most accurate data on the number of annual homicides in
Colombia.
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decreases with aid, then one can assume that foreign assistance had a direct effect on
guerrilla violence in Colombia, as well as possibly has had an indirect influence on the
drug trade.
Finally, in order to evaluate the effect that foreign assistance has had on the
Colombian drug trade specifically, I choose a key dependent variable, the estimated
cultivation of coca from 1983-2002, to reflect the change in overall drug production in
Colombia. This data can be obtained from the International Narcotics Strategy Report to
Congress. 6 When determining the effect that foreign assistance has had on Colombia’s
overall drug trade, it is important to evaluate the estimated cultivation of illegal drugs in
Colombia. According to Phillip McLean, Colombia’s weak institutions are a direct result
of corruption caused by illegal drug activity (McLean 2002:123). Drug production has
had severe consequences in all areas of Colombian society. Despite many eradication
efforts, there has been a steady increase in the amount of coca cultivation in Colombia.
In order to monitor cultivation more closely; in 1999, the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime funded the “Illicit Crops Monitoring Project-SIMCI.”

This introduced

technology, such as satellite imagery and aerial photographs, in order to locate and
quantify the amount of coca cultivation in Colombia (UNODC 2003:4).
Since Colombia is the world’s number one coca leaf grower in the world, I chart
the estimated cultivation of coca over time, compare it to the amount of foreign
assistance given to Colombia, and then determine the relationship between coca
cultivation and foreign aid through a multivariate regression analysis. If there is a

6

In order to obtain the amount of estimated cultivation of coca in Colombia prior to 1997, it is necessary to
review the reports to Congress under the “archives” section.
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statistically significant negative relationship between the amount of estimated cultivation
and foreign aid, then one can assume that foreign assistance has had an effect on the
amount of coca cultivation in Colombia—thus curbing Colombia’s overall drug
production.
Independent Variables
Since the purpose of this study is to test for the effectiveness of U.S. foreign
assistance, I divide U.S. foreign assistance into three key independent variables to better
assess the impact of each type of aid; these include economic loans and grants, military
loans and grants, and total loans and grants, which is the sum of the economic and
military loans and grants. 7 Each of the three key independent variables are used to
measure the amount of foreign assistance given to Colombia from 1980-2002, and can be
obtained from the U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, also known as the USAID
Greenbook. In each Greenbook, foreign assistance is reported by the recipient country
annually, and then organized by the United State Agency for International Development
(USAID).

Unfortunately, data regarding the amount of U.S. foreign assistance

distributed throughout the world is very complicated and poorly organized. There are
multiple aid organizations that distribute assistance, and often times, organizations
exclude some aid sources from their data compilations.

Although the USAID

Greenbooks do not include every aid organization or every program funded by U.S.
foreign aid, the Greenbook is, overall, an adequate measure of how much foreign
assistance was distributed to a specific country over time. Additionally, comparing
Greenbook data to other data sources suggests that these data track consistently over time
7

A list of all independent variables is located in Table 2 of Appendix A.
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with those figures provided by other sources. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, I
use data collected from the USAID Greenbook to reflect the general trend in foreign
assistance given to Colombia from 1980-2002.
According to the USAID Greenbook, a loan is any transfer of funds in which the
recipient acquires a legal debt, and repayment is required over time. A grant is any cash
transfer for which the recipient incurs no legal debt. In this study, I include both loans
and grants to evaluate the overall assistance (total, economic, and military assistance)
given to Colombia.
Total economic assistance is broken down into four funding categories. These
categories include aid distributed by USAID and its Predecessor, by the Department of
Agriculture, by the Department of State, and by other economic assistance programs.
The first category of USAID funds includes all assistance that accounts for funding under
USAID programs. Assistance distributed under the Department of Agriculture typically
consists of food aid programs funded by the Department of Agriculture. Aid programs
listed under the Department of State include those programs specifically designed for
narcotics control and current Andean counter drug initiatives, along with other programs
that support increasing democracy abroad. Finally, the category titled, Other Economic
Assistance, includes any other active economic loan or grant reported annually. This
includes programs such as the Peace Corps, along with contributions from multilateral
organizations that are targeted at economic development (USAID).
In the USAID Greenbook, total military assistance includes loans or grants with a
non-economic-development purpose.

Military assistance includes programs such as

International Military Education & Training (IMET), Peace Keeping Operations (PKO),
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and Foreign Military Funds (FMF). Finally, total loans and grants include the total
amount of economic loans and grants and military loans and grants combined.

In

addition, total loans and grants also include non-concessional support that consists of
export-import bank loans and other non-concessional U.S. Loans including those
distributed by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). Generally speaking,
this data includes any direct loan or loan guarantee reported by Colombia for any specific
year. 8
When analyzing data results regarding economic and military data, one should
approach results with caution.

A significant amount of foreign aid was given to

Colombia in the form of “narcotics aid,” specifically designed to reduce narco-trafficking
and other drug activity. In reality, this money was split between economic assistance
programs and military assistance programs, with the majority of the money going toward
military programs. USAID, however, groups the entire narcotics fund into the category
of economic assistance. Therefore, the amount of total military assistance to Colombia is
actually higher than what is presented in this data analysis, and the economic aid is
accordingly reduced. 9,10 Of course, this discrepancy is consistent throughout all data
years, and the total loans and grants figure does not suffer from this shortcoming.

8

USAID also indicates Loan Programs that have become inactive. However, this data is not available prior
to FY 2003.
9
Clarification regarding what programs the USAID Greenbooks include and exclude was obtained via
personal communication with Adam Isacson, an employee for The Center for International Policy’s.
10
Prior to FY 2003, data in the USAID Greenbooks do not include assistance to some economic or military
programs. The Greenbook does not include economic and social assistance programs such as the Counter
Terror Fellowship Program (2000-2003), Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies which began in 1997,
Section 1004, Section 1033 (data not available prior to 1997), Discretionary Funds (popular in the late
1990s), Small Arms and Light Weapons Program, Excess Defense Articles, and Emergency Drawdowns.
The majority of the data lacking in the Greenbook is related to military assistance. Therefore, when
interpreting data it is important to keep in mind that total economic assistance includes the entire narcotics
fund. Also, many military assistance programs (most from the Department of Defense), are not included in
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Other Independent Variables
In addition to the key independent variables discussed above, throughout my analysis I
account for several other factors that might influence the policy objectives being
examined here as dependent variables. When testing the effect that foreign assistance has
in the broad area of drug-related law enforcement activity, I first control for the
Colombia’s level of democracy by using data from 1980-2002, obtained from the Polity
IV. Colombia’s polity score measures its level of institutionalized democracy. This data
was taken from Polity IV which subtracts the state’s autocracy score from its democracy
score to produce an eleven-point indicator of structural democracy—a score of 10 being
the most democratic. Here, democracy is partially determined by the ability of citizens to
express effective views about existing policies and leaders. Additionally, the level of
constraints placed on the executive in power is taken into consideration, with a greater
level indicative of higher levels of democracy. Autocracy represents a lack of political
freedoms that may restrict or suppress competitive political participation. An eleven
point autocracy scale is constructed additively according to five areas: Competitiveness
of Executive Recruitment, Openness of Executive Recruitment, Constraints on Chief
Executive, Regulation of Participation, and Competitiveness of Participation. The total
autocracy number is then subtracted by the number reflecting institutionalized democracy
(Polity IV).
Second, I control for the economic state of Colombia by including its GDP per
capita. This data came from the World Development Indicators 2004. Colombia’s GDP

the data. Although I include the analysis of each type of data, one could probably draw more accurate
results by assessing how total loans and grants affected the dependent variable.
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per capita is an acceptable way to measure the size and condition of its economy. This is
important because as Colombia’s economy is stimulated, more money can be spent on
law enforcement objectives.

Furthermore, a poor economy reduces the amount of

available money, therefore decreasing the average income.

Therefore, Colombia’s

economic environment may directly increase or decrease the available funds needed to
carry out law enforcement objectives. As suggested by existing literature, controlling for
a country’s economic environment is essential to gaining an accurate measure of the
impact of aid (Durbarry 2000:4).

If Colombia’s economy is stimulated, then the

government may have the means necessary to increase law enforcement across the
country.
Finally, I control for Colombia’s presidential party affiliation by using a dummy
variable to control for Colombia’s conservative Presidents.

In this study, President

Uribe, an independent, is coded the same as a president affiliated with the Liberal party,
due to the fact that his origins were in the Liberal party. Also, my objective is to test
conservative versus non-conservative presidents. 11

When controlling for Colombia’s

presidential party, one could expect, that if Colombia’s president belongs to the
Conservative party, then drug-related law enforcement activity may increase due to
general accepted policies of the Conservative party. In addition, I also use a trend
variable to address the natural trending in the dependent variables and address the issue
of autocorrelation.
Those variables that affect law enforcement similarly affect the dependent
variables that measure guerrilla violence, with an additional variable that measures
11

Treating President Uribe uniquely does not change the findings.
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Colombia’s unemployment rate from the International Labor Office (ILO). In this case,
the level of democracy, measured using the Polity score, is important because if
Colombia becomes more democratic, guerrilla groups may be more likely to have a say
in overall policies, and therefore, are less likely to engage in violence. For example, in
the past, guerrilla leaders have created their own parties and won local elections; this may
decrease the overall level of violence carried out by guerrillas for political purposes (Von
der Walde 2001:2). Therefore, as Colombia’s level of democracy increases, guerrilla
violence that is motivated by political reasons is expected to decrease—as the guerillas
participate in democratic elections.
Colombia’s GDP per capita may also influence guerrilla violence. If Colombia’s
economy is improving, guerrillas may find it more difficult to recruit soldiers. On the
contrary, if Colombia’s GDP per capita is low, than the average citizen may do whatever
is necessary to provide for himself and his family, even if it means joining illegally armed
groups. Also, if Colombia’s economy is not stable, then the average citizen may be
driven to violence, even apart from guerrilla violence. Finally, a poor economy may
increase guerrilla violence by creating more of a need to obtain money from kidnapping.
In sum, if Colombia’s GDP per capita is low, then there are reasons to believe that
guerilla violence will increase out of the necessity to provide and survive (suggested in
Durbarry 1998).
Along the same lines, when measuring Colombia’s GDP per capita, I control for
Colombia’s unemployment rate from 1980-2002.

A change in Colombia’s

unemployment rate may increase guerrilla violence, in the sense that those who are
unemployed may go to extreme measures to do what is necessary to survive. An increase
77

in unemployment may drive the average citizen to begin working with drug traffickers
and guerrilla groups. This may increase the number of people working in the drug trade,
which previously mentioned, has a direct relationship with violence (UNODC 2003:25).
Similar to that of law enforcement, controlling for Colombia’s conservative
presidential affiliation may indicate a decrease in the amount of guerrilla violence. As
previously mentioned, conservatives are more likely to increase law enforcement and
military activity, thus affecting overall violence in Colombia (suggested in Crandall
2001).
Finally, when assessing Colombia’s overall drug production, I test to see a change
in the estimated cultivation of coca in Colombia. When analyzing a change in the
estimated cultivation of coca, I include these control variables: Colombia’s polity score,
GDP per capita, unemployment rate, Conservative presidential party affiliation, and
Colombia’s rural population density obtained from the World Bank.
In this case, Colombia’s level of democracy may have influenced the amount of
estimated cultivation by creating new and innovative ways to address the issue. For
example, if Colombia became more democratic, and the average farmer was able to
affectively communicate his needs to the Colombian government, then it is possible that
farmers would have been more likely to work with the government in addressing the
issue of illegal cultivation.

The Colombian government has continually developed

alternative agricultural programs for farmers, in order to give farmers the resources
necessary to avoid illicit cultivation. Therefore, one can assume that the more democratic
the country became the less estimated cultivation of coca occurred.
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Colombia’s GDP per capita is also an important control variable because a change
in the country’s GDP per capita may reflect the available resources needed to spend on
alternative development programs for farmers.

Therefore, one can assume that, if

Colombia’s economy was stimulated, then the government would have had more
resources available to farmers.

If farmers received what they needed from the

government, instead of drug traffickers, then they may have been more likely to grow
legitimate crops. Therefore, if there was an overall increase in Colombia’s GDP per
capita, then it is possible that the estimated cultivation may have decreased (Burnside
2000:32).
An increase in Colombia’s unemployment rate may have also impacted the
country’s estimated cultivation of coca.

As previously mentioned, an increase in

unemployment may turn people to violence and crime.

Similarly, an increase in

unemployment may have reduced confidence in Colombia’s government to provide for
the people. Therefore, farmers and civilians that were dependent on legitimate crops may
have turned to where the money is in order to survive and provide for themselves and
their families. With an increase in unemployment, one could expect that the amount of
estimated cultivation of coca would have increased in Colombia (suggested in Durbarry
1998:1).
In addition to Colombia’s polity score, GDP per capita, and its unemployment
rate, Colombia’s presidential party affiliation, may have had an impact on the amount of
estimated cultivation in Colombia. One again, if Colombia’s president is conservative,
one could expect tighter military and police activity. Therefore, if Colombia’s president
belonged to the conservative party, the amount of estimated cultivation in Colombia may
79

have decreased as the conservative policies may have increased law enforcement activity
(suggested in Hartlyn 1998)..
Finally, Colombia’s rural population density provides a reflection on the amount
of land that may be available for the cultivation of any plant, including the coca plant.
Therefore, a change in Colombia’s rural population density may result in a change of
overall coca cultivation. If Colombia’s rural population density increase, then it is likely
that available land for growing coca would have decreased, resulting in an overall
decrease of estimated cultivation of coca. Collectively, then, these reasons indicate why I
have chosen to focus on analyzing the data outlined herein (Arce forthcoming:18).
To analyze these data, two approaches will be used. First, a visual examination of
the charts that plot the dependent variables over time will be conducted, comparing the
observed trends to those that exist in the charts of aid over time. If trends in the
dependent variables are similar to those for aid, it suggests that aid and the dependent
variables are correlated.
Second, a more sophisticated examination of these data will involve the use of
multiple time-series analysis using ordinary least squares regression. This statistical
technique makes it possible to estimate the size and nature of the statistical relationship
between a dependent and independent variable. Additionally, this technique makes it
possible to control for other variables that may influence changes in the dependent
variables.
One difficulty in performing time-series analysis with ordinary least squares
regression is the presence of autocorrelation. This is defined as, “correlation between
members of observations ordered in time [as in time-series data]” (Gujarati 1999:378).
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The problem that autocorrelation poses for estimating a model using ordinary least
squares regression is that it results in tests of statistical significance for the regression
coefficients that are biased. Without taking this problem into consideration I could make
decisions about the statistical significance of the regression coefficients that are not
correct. The Durbin-Watson statistic is used to determine if autocorrelation is a problem
for each model. In most cases, the Durbin-Watson statistic indicated that autocorrelation
was present in the models. When this is the case, a trend variable is included that begins
at 0 for the first year and increases by 1 for each following year. The coefficients for the
other variables are then interpreted as the influence of the independent variable on the
dependent variable, holding year constant.
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9. Bivariate Analysis
In order to better understand how each key dependent variable has changed over
time, I have graphed the available data for each dependent variable. Also, I have graphed
the total amount of loans and grants distributed to Colombia from 1980-2002. After
graphing each key dependent variable, I discuss how the dependent variable has changed
over time and compare it to the change in total loans and grants distributed to Colombia.
This will help illustrate the direction of the dependent variable over time, compared to the
total foreign assistance given to Colombia. 12 By evaluating data represented in each
graph, one may be able to identify a relationship between a key dependent variable and
the amount of foreign assistance given to Colombia.
Figure 1 presents the total amount of U.S. loans and grants given to Colombia
from 1980-2002 in Constant $U.S. In 1980, Colombia received $46.8 million. U.S.
foreign aid to Colombia remained relatively constant for approximately ten years.
However, in 1990, total loans and grants to Colombia increased in order to assist the
nation in fighting the war on drugs. In 1990, Colombia received $123.3 million in U.S.
foreign assistance, a slight increase compared to prior years. This is most likely due to
President H.W. Bush’s $2.2 billion increase in aid to the Andean region. However, over
the next five years, foreign assistance began to decrease. This is most likely due to the
election of President Clinton and his decision to decrease anti-narcotics funding. In
1995, foreign assistance began to gradually increase as the Republican party took over
the U.S. Congress and allotted funds once again in support of fighting the drug war.
Finally, in 2000, U.S. foreign assistance reached its peak at $1,231.1 million. This
12

Refer to Appendix B for each figure discussed in this section.
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reflects the implementation of Plan Colombia. Although aid to Colombia spiked in 2000,
assistance was not sustained at this level. Even so, for the next two years total foreign
assistance would remain higher than any other year prior to 2000. In 2002, Colombia’s
assistance fell to $550.7 million, which was approximately half of what it was in 2000.
In sum, total foreign assistance to Colombia remained relatively constant until the 1990s
when aid slightly increased. Following a minimal decrease, aid began to increase again,
after 1995. Aid drastically increased in 2000, and then dropped in 2001. Although aid
was not sustained after 2000, foreign assistance was relatively higher compared to its
previous years.
Figures 2 and 3 present the trends in the variables used to represent law enforcement
activity in Colombia.

Specifically, Figure 2 plots the total number of drug labs destroyed

from 1981-2001, in addition to, the cumulative amount of loans and grants given to
Colombia from 1980-2002. In 1981, 31 drug labs were destroyed by the Colombian
armed forces. For subsequent years, the number of labs destroyed gradually increased
until 1987, when it reached its peak at 1,359 labs destroyed. This is consistent with fact
that during the 1980s, drug activity was beginning to surface in Colombia. One would
expect that if overall drug activity increased during the 1980s, then so would the number
of drug lab used in order to process illegal drugs. Therefore, if more drugs labs were
being established in order to process more drugs, then it is likely that law enforcement
detected and destroyed more labs, as the overall number of labs increased.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the number of labs consistently decreased
until 1996 when the number of labs destroyed reached 885. For the next three years,
there was a gradual decrease in labs destroyed. However, in 1999 and 2000, the number
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of labs destroyed began to increase again. Since the number of labs destroyed reached its
peak in 1987, when foreign assistance to Colombia was relatively low, and then peaked
again in 1996, this graph does not seem to indicate that past foreign assistance has helped
to improve law enforcement with regard to the number of drug labs destroyed. Also,
since there is no gradual trend in the number of labs destroyed, it is difficult to know if
the increase after year 2000 is due to the increase of aid in Colombia or not. Although
there seems to be no relationship between the number of drug labs destroyed, and the
amount of foreign assistance given to Colombia, we will be able to assess the relationship
in more detail, after analyzing the multivariate analysis.
Figure 3 plots two key dependent variables that represent law enforcement
activity in Colombia. First, Figure 3 shows the amount of cocaine and base seized (kilos)
from Colombian law enforcement from 1981-2001. In 1981, the amount of cocaine and
base seized amounted to about 359 kilos. For the next four years, there was an increase
in the amount of cocaine and base seized until 1985, when it began to decrease. The
amount of cocaine and base seized, spiked in 1991 when Colombian officers seized
approximately 81,000 kilos of cocaine and base. Although the amount of cocaine and
base seized spiked again in 1994, an overall decrease in cocaine and base seized occurred
for the next eight years.
After graphing the available data for the amount of cocaine and base seized
(kilos), and then comparing it with the total amount of foreign assistance given to
Colombia, one may observe a slight relationship between the amount of cocaine and base
seized, and the total amount of foreign assistance given to Colombia. For example, the
total amount of cocaine and base seized in Colombia, spiked in 1991, approximately one
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year after President H.W. Bush initiated his $2.2 billion Andean Initiative (Crandall
2001:101).
Although the amount of cocaine and base seized reached its peak in 1991, from
that point forward the overall amount of cocaine and base seized began to decrease, even
as the total amount of foreign assistance increased. Therefore, after comparing the
amount of cocaine and base seized to the total amount of foreign assistance to Colombia
over time, one may predict that the two variables might have a very slight relationship;
however, it is not likely that the relationship is significant. Again, more specific
conclusions can be determined after examining the results of the multivariate analysis.
The second line plotted in Figure 3 is the amount of coca sprayed (ha) in
Colombia by aerial fumigation from 1981-2001. Aerial fumigation is a relatively new
way to deter farmers from growing illegal crops. Therefore, there was no coca sprayed
from 1981-1984. However, in 1985, 1,334 ha of coca were sprayed by the Colombian
military. The amount of coca sprayed remained low until the mid-1990s when aerial
fumigation began to rapidly increase. In 1995, about 25,000 ha of coca were sprayed.
Two years later, approximately 41,000 ha of coca were sprayed. One year later, in 1998,
aerial fumigation increased to about 66,083 ha of coca sprayed. Finally, in 2001, the
amount of coca sprayed reached its peak at 94,153 ha of coca sprayed. In sum, beginning
in the mid-1990s, the amount of coca sprayed by Colombian law enforcement increased
over time, and reached it peak in 2001.
After graphing the amount of coca sprayed (ha), and comparing it with the total
amount of foreign assistance to Colombia, one can see an obvious parallel relationship
between the two variables. For example, the amount of coca sprayed began to steadily
85

increase beginning in 1994. One year later, the amount of foreign assistance to Colombia
began to incline. Similarly, the amount of coca sprayed reached its peak in 2001—one
year after Plan Colombia was initiated.

Therefore, both variables that measure the

amount of coca sprayed and total loans and grants show an overall steady increase that
began in the mid-1990s and peaked in 2001. In sum, both data indicate similar trends and
therefore may possibly be correlated. However, one will be able to clarify the exact
relationship after regressing the amount of coca sprayed on the total loans and grants to
Colombia.
Figures 4 and 5 present the variables used to represent guerrilla violence in
Colombia. Specifically, Figure 4 plots the total number of kidnappings (per thousand
inhabitants) reported in Colombia from 1990-2002. In 1990, about 1,000 kidnappings
were reported in Colombia. The following year, reported kidnappings increased by about
a thousand. For the next four years, kidnappings remained relatively lower, but after
1995, kidnappings began to gradually increase—most likely due to the increase in
guerrilla violence and drug activity. Reported kidnappings peaked in 1999 with 3,706.
The following years show a constant decrease in reported kidnappings.

However,

although the number of kidnappings (per thousand in inhabitants) gradually decreases,
kidnappings remained relatively high until 2002. It appears that the total amount of
reported kidnappings (per thousand inhabitants) gradually increases over time.
After graphing the number of reported kidnappings and comparing the available
data to the total loans and grants given to Colombia from 1980-2002, one can see that
both kidnappings (per thousand in habitants) and total loans and grants gradually
increased during the late 1990s and peaked around year 2000. Also, both decreased after
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2001, but remained higher, compared to earlier years.

This data indicates that a

relationship between the amount of kidnappings and the amount of foreign assistance
may have a slight relationship in the opposite, expected, direction. If this is the case, then
other variables such as Colombia’s GDP per capita or its unemployment rate may be
other potential factors that influence the number of reported kidnappings.
Figure 5 plots the number of homicides (per thousand inhabitants) that occurred in
Colombia from 1981-2002. In 1981, about 10,000 people were murdered. Over the next
ten years, Colombia’s homicide rate gradually increased and peaked in 1991 with
approximately 28,000 homicides.

This is most likely due to the violent guerrilla

movement that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s. After Colombia’s homicide rate
peaked in 1991, there was a constant decrease until 2002—however even then, the
homicide rate was relatively higher than previous years.
Although the data does not illustrate a direct relationship between the number of
homicides in Colombia from 1981-2002 and the total loans and grants given to Colombia
from 1980-2002, it is difficult to assess any relationship between the two variables.
Colombia’s homicide rate reached its peak in 1991, approximately the same time that aid
slightly increased to Colombia.

However, as foreign assistance remained relatively

consistent from 1990 to 1997, the homicide rate began to decrease following 1991.
When aid began to increase again after 1997, the country’s homicide rate began to
steadily increase as well. Therefore, based on both graphs, it is difficult to determine if
there is any relationship between Colombia’s homicide rate and the amount of foreign
assistance given to Colombia.
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Figure 6 presents the trend in the variable used to represent the overall drug
production in Colombia. Specifically, Figure 6 plots the amount of estimated cultivation
of coca (ha) in Colombia from 1983-2002. In 1983, about 11,000 ha of coca were
cultivated in Colombia. From that point forward, the amount of coca cultivated gradually
increased over time. In the 1980s, coca cultivation reached a high of about 43,000 ha of
coca. This would seem like a small number by 2002, when estimated cultivation reached
its peak at 267,145 ha.
Overall, beginning in 1983, the amount of estimated cultivation of coca in
Colombia steadily increased over time until it reaches its peak in 2002. This is similar to
the trend illustrated in the total amount of foreign assistance given to Colombia from
1980-2002. Based on the comparison between the estimated cultivation of coca over
time, and the total amount of loans and grants given to Colombia over time, a parallel
trend can be observed. Both data represent a small quantity in the early 1980s, and then
gradually increase over time until the late 1990s. Therefore, based on the comparison of
raw data, there appears to be a relationship between the amount of estimated cultivation
of coca and the amount of foreign assistance given to Colombia.

However, this

relationship negative, opposite the expected direction.
In sum, a visual comparison that presents the trends in the variables used to
represent law enforcement activity in Colombia, indicate only a partial support for the
hypothesis that the amount of foreign assistance is related to law enforcement activity in
Colombia. It appears that the amount of coca sprayed increased over time with aid,
exhibiting a very similar trend. Therefore, foreign assistance may have influenced the
amount of law enforcement activity, but only with respect to aerial fumigation. There is
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no evidence of a bivariate correlation with the other dependent variables measuring law
enforcement.
Similarly, a visual comparison that presents the trends in the variables used to
represent guerrilla violence in Colombia, indicate that foreign assistance has no
significant relationship to the amount of guerrilla violence in Colombia. Although the
number of reported kidnappings increased over time, as did aid, this data is inconsistent
with the expected direction. Therefore, one can assume that other factors may influence
the increase of reported kidnappings, apart from foreign assistance. Based on the visual
comparison of Colombia’s homicide rate and the amount of foreign assistance, data was
inconclusive. There was no indication that foreign assistance influenced Colombia’s
homicide rate.
Finally, the figures indicate that overall drug production in Colombia manifests a
similar trend to that of foreign assistance.

Both variables, estimated cultivation in

Colombia and total loans and grants given to Colombia indicate an overall increase over
time. Both data began with a small amount and increase annually until the total amount
of foreign aid peaked in 2000. Therefore, similar trends in the data suggest that there
may be a relationship between the amount of estimated cultivation in Colombia and the
amount of foreign assistance given to Colombia. Although the plotted data shows similar
trends, the data suggest a relationship that is opposite of the expected direction.
Therefore, on could assume that other factors may be directly related to the overall
estimated cultivation of coca.
Although plotting the key dependent variables and comparing them with the total
loans and grants given to Colombia may suggest some relationships between key
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variables, there are limitations for testing the hypothesis in this manner. It is a suggestive
interpretation of the overall trends in the dependent variable compared to the independent
variable. However, no statistical estimate of the relationship of foreign aid and the
dependent variable can be made.

Other factors that may influence the relationship

between foreign aid and the dependent variable were not taken into consideration when
interpreting the comparison of data.

A better approach to test the hypothesis that

overcomes these limitations is the use of a multivariate time-series analysis using
ordinary least squares regression.
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10. Multivariate Analysis
Analysis of Law Enforcement
A more sophisticated way to test the relationship between foreign assistance and
the variables that represent law enforcement, guerrilla violence, and drug production, is
to conduct a multivariate time-series analysis using ordinary least squares.

In this

section, I regress each type of foreign assistance (total, economic, and military) on each
key dependent variable. 13 To test the relationship between aid and law enforcement, I
regress all types of aid on the number of drug labs destroyed, the amount of cocaine and
base seized (kilos), and the amount of coca sprayed (ha) from 1981-2001.
The multivariate regression analysis that examines the relationship between the
number of drug labs destroyed and foreign assistance is presented in Table 3. 14 One
would expect that if foreign assistance programs are accomplishing its goals, then the
number of drug labs destroyed in Colombia would increase with aid. However, Models
1, 2, and 3 do not indicate a causal relationship between the number of drug labs
destroyed and the amount of foreign assistance (total, economic, or military) distributed
to Colombia.
One objective of aid programs has been to increase law enforcement in order to
decrease drug activity. Therefore, foreign assistance programs are specifically designed
to increase law enforcement personnel, which would allow police to check areas
previously unmonitored. This is important in the actual detection of drug labs. In
addition to an increase in law enforcement personnel, foreign assistance programs have

13
14

Refer to Table 2 in Appendix A for a description of each variable.
Table 3 is located in Appendix A.
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aimed to increase training in the area of military intelligence—specifically as it relates to
combating drug activity. This may also be useful when attempting to detect newlyestablished drug laboratories. Therefore, since the data show no correlation between the
amount of foreign assistance given to Colombia and the number of drug labs destroyed,
foreign aid does not seem to have an effect on law enforcement in this area.
One possible reason that aid shows no correlation may be explained by the
corruption of law enforcement officials. According to the UNODC, in 2002, a corruption
scandal surfaced that reflected irregularities in how anti-narcotic aid was being used.
This specific scandal involved Anti-Narcotics police using foreign assistance in order to
cover the cost of unauthorized trips. In spite of anti-corruption policies, corruption still
seems to be weakening havoc on Colombia’s institutions. If corruption has influenced
law enforcement in this way, additional aid would not effectively assist the overall goals
of increasing law enforcement activity. Therefore, it is not surprising that aid shows no
relationship with the number of drug labs destroyed (UNODC 2003:27).
One variable that is statistically significant across all three models is the dummy
variable measuring Colombia’s conservative presidents.

The data indicates that if

Colombia’s president belongs to the Conservative party, then the number of drug labs
destroyed is expected to decrease by approximately 400 labs. Across all three models,
the data are statistically significant at the 90% confidence level (or alpha of .10). These
findings are consistent with what is generally expected from the Conservative party.
Conservative policies are usually more likely to increase military and law enforcement
efforts. Therefore, it is not surprising to find a relationship between a president’s party
affiliation and the number of drug labs destroyed. In this table there are no other
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variables that are statistically significant with the number of drug labs destroyed in
Colombia.
Across all three models in Table 3, the R-Squared values are very low and none of
the F values are statistically significant. This indicates that the models neither fit the data
well, nor are they statistically strong. However, in each model, the Durbin-Watson
statistic is close to 2, indicating no appreciable autocorrelation.

15

In sum, Table 3

indicates that foreign assistance is not correlated with the number of drug labs destroyed.
However, the president’s party affiliation does seem to impact law enforcement in this
area.

Overall, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis, that U.S. foreign

assistance to Colombia will not improve the effectiveness of law enforcement activity.
The multivariate regression analysis that examines the relationship between the
amount of cocaine and base seized and U.S. foreign assistance is presented in Table 4. 16
Assuming that foreign assistance programs are increasing interdiction efforts, one would
expect to see an increase in the amount of drugs seized by police as aid increases.
Specific programs have been designed in order to increase law enforcement and target
narco-trafficking. The United States has funded programs such as the Air Bridge Denial
program and the Special Reconnaissance and Assault Unit of the Colombian Navy, in
order to increase both aerial and maritime interdiction.
However, after running the regression analysis, the data indicate that there is no
significant relationship between the amount of foreign assistance (of any type) given to

15

The Durbin-Watson statistic indicated that autocorrelation was present in some models. When this is the
case, a trend variable is included that begins at 0 for the first year and increases by 1 for each following
year. The coefficients for the other variables are then interpreted as the influence of the independent
variable on the dependent variable, holding year constant.
16
Table 4 is located in Appendix A.
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Colombia and the amount of cocaine and base seized. Again, one reason for this may be
corruption within Colombia’s law enforcement institutions. One of the most important
institutions that are responsible for drug control in Colombia is the Anti-Narcotics Police.
As previously determined, corruption has been a concern for officials within this specific
institution.

In addition, corruption within Colombia’s law enforcement has been

addressed by the U.S. Congress almost annually, prior to 1998. Over the years, some
Colombian law enforcement officials have seemingly worked with those involved in the
drug trade. In fact, in 1998, Colombian security forces fired about 90 officers that were
believed to be corrupt (Crandall 2001:105). Assuming that corruption has weakened law
enforcement efforts, one would not expect additional assistance to improve overall law
enforcement interdiction efforts.
This is consistent with what was hypothesized. If Colombia’s institutions are
weak and lack the capacity to use funds appropriately, this would undermine the
effectiveness of law enforcement efforts such as cocaine seized, even with an increase in
aid. Therefore, foreign assistance would show no correlation with the amount of cocaine
and base seized by Colombian police.
In all three models, GDP per capita, which is used to control for the overall state
of the Colombian economy, is statistically significant. This indicates that as Colombia’s
economy was stimulated, the amount of cocaine and base seized also increased. In fact,
for every one dollar increase in GDP per capita, we can expect the amount of cocaine and
base seized to increase by about 55 kilos. To use more realistic numbers, with every
$1,000 increase in GDP per capita, one would expect the amount of cocaine and base
seized to increase by 55,000 kilos. This is statistically significant at the 95% confidence
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level (or alpha .05). These findings are not surprising. In fact, if the economy is
stimulated, then more overall resources may be available for interdiction operations.
Also, if the economy is doing well, people may be less likely to work with drug
traffickers. An overall stimulation of the economy will help Colombians feel optimistic
about the government’s role in fighting the drug war. Aside from the GDP per capita, no
other independent variable was statistically significant.
Across all three models, the R-squared value is around .7 which indicates that the
model describes about 70% of the variation in the amount of cocaine and base seized
annually. In all three models, the F value is significant, indicating that all three models
provide a statistically significant explanation of the dependent variable. Finally, all of the
models have a Durbin-Watson statistic very close to 2, indicating little to no
autocorrelation. In sum, the data testing the relationship between the amount of foreign
and aid the amount of cocaine and base seized are not statistically significant—indicating
no causal relationship in either direction.

In addition, Colombia’s GDP per capita

indicates that as Colombia’s economy is stimulated, the amount of cocaine and base
seized is also expected to increase.
Finally, the multivariate regression analysis that examines the relationship
between the amount of coca sprayed (ha) and foreign assistance is presented in Table 5. 17
Due to the controversial nature of aerial fumigation and its recent implementation and
then more recent suspension, when regressing the amount of coca sprayed on the amount
of foreign assistance, it is difficult to determine how foreign aid really affects the amount
of coca sprayed. Aerial fumigation is relatively new and very controversial. However,
17

Table 5 is located in Appendix A.
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the United States has always supported aerial fumigation efforts—including providing
aircrafts necessary to carry them out. Although the United States has supported aerial
fumigation, many environmentalists and Colombian citizens have spoken out about the
effects it has had on legitimate crops. In addition, Colombian citizens have expressed
concerns about the chemicals sprayed, and how they may affect the health of those it
comes in contact with.

Due to the controversy surrounding the subject of aerial

fumigation, in addition to existing literature that indicates aid is not effective, it is not
surprising that the data in Table 5 show no statistically significant relationship between
the amount of foreign assistance (of any type) and the amount of coca sprayed.
However, polity score, used to measure the level of democracy in Colombia, is
statistically significant across all three models at the 95% confidence level (or alpha of
.05). This indicates that as Colombia became more democratic, the amount of coca
sprayed decreased. Specifically, were Colombia to increase its level of democracy by
one point on the eleven-point scale to 8, from its current 7, we would expect a decrease of
the amount of coca sprayed by about 11,000 ha. Again, this may reflect the heightened
popular concern about aerial fumigation and the chemicals used in order to kill the crops.
Not only are people concerned about the chemicals being used with regard to their health,
but local farmers and governmental officials who support alternative crop development
programs argue that the actual drift of the chemicals kill crops grown by nearby
landowners. Other concerns regarding aerial fumigation include the danger of flying the
planes necessary to carry out the fumigation process. There have been several instances
where planes were shot down by guerrillas and the pilots aboard were either executed or
kidnapped. Therefore, if more policies are shaped by the views of the people, one could
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expect the amount of coca sprayed in Colombia to decrease as these concerns are
addressed.
In addition to polity score, Model 3 indicates that presidential affiliation is
correlated with the amount of coca sprayed.

Specifically, if Colombia’s president

belongs to the Conservative party, then the amount of coca sprayed is expected to
increase by about 12,000 ha of land. This is consistent with the fact that in 2000, foreign
assistance drastically increased, in part, to carry out aerial fumigation objectives. During
this time, President Pastrana (conservative) was president. In contrast, if a president is
elected that is not affiliated with the Conservative party, one could expect the overall
amount of coca sprayed to decrease. This is currently the case with President Uribe, as
he has suspended aerial fumigation in areas of Colombia, specifically along its border
with Ecuador (UPI 2002:1). Findings may largely reflect accepted and expected policies
by the Conservative party regarding law enforcement strategies.
In all three models, the R-squared values are high, approximately 80%, and all
three F values are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level (or alpha of .01).
This indicates that the each model is strong and fits the data well. In addition, the
Durbin-Watson statistic is approximately 1.6 which indicates that the effects of
autocorrelation cannot be determined, but are likely to be limited. In sum, there is no
relationship between the amount of foreign assistance and the amount out of coca sprayed
(ha) by Colombian officials. However, as Colombia becomes more democratic, one can
expect a decrease in the amount of coca sprayed.

On the contrary, if Colombia’s

president is conservative, one can expect aerial fumigation to increase. Overall, the data
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show no relationship between aid and eradication efforts carried out by Colombian law
enforcement.
Analysis of Guerrilla Violence
To test the relationship between foreign assistance and the level of guerrilla
activity, I regress all types of aid on the number of reported kidnappings (per thousand in
habitants) and the number of homicides (per thousand inhabitants). The multivariate
regression analysis that examined the relationship between foreign assistance and persons
kidnapped is presented in Table 6. 18

Assuming that assistance to Colombia has

successfully provided more security for its people, one would expect the number of
kidnappings to decrease as aid increased. However, all three models indicate that there is
no statistically significant relationship between the amount of foreign assistance (of any
type) and the overall number of people kidnapped.

In fact, there is no significant

indication that Colombia’s level of democracy, GDP per capita, unemployment rate, or
president’s party affiliation (conservative) influences the number of kidnappings (per
thousand inhabitants) either.
These findings lend support to theories presented by Peter Boon who argued that
foreign aid does not reach those that it is intended to help. Ideally, foreign assistance
would help decrease poverty which would allow civilians to have the means necessary to
protect themselves against guerrilla activity. According to the World Bank, over one half
of the population in Colombia lives in poverty (UNODC 2003:9). Due to the extreme
poverty in Colombia, the average civilian is at an extreme disadvantage when trying to
protect themselves against the wealthy guerrillas. If Boon is correct, and overall foreign
18

Table 6 is located in Appendix A.
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assistance to Colombia is not reaching those that need it most, then it is not surprising to
find no relationship between the amount of foreign aid and the number of kidnappings in
Colombia. Also, Boon argues that foreign aid actually increases inequality which is
likely to increase violence. According to the UNODC, “inequality is at the root of
Colombia’s 40 year civil war” (UNODC 2003:9). Therefore, if Boon is correct, and
foreign aid is increasing inequality within Colombia, violence is expected to increase
with aid. In this case, the data are consistent with my hypothesis. However, one should
approach these findings with caution. The data that indicate the number of kidnappings
reported over a long period of time is not available. The data that are available is often
flawed because all kidnappings are not reported to authorities for fear of reprisals
(UNODC 2003:28). Therefore, due to the lack of data available for kidnappings and the
ambiguity that involves the actual reporting of kidnappings, this study may not reveal the
actual relationship between the amount of foreign assistance and the level of guerrilla
violence with respect to kidnappings.
In all three models, the R-squared value is around .9 which indicates that the
model describes approximately 90% of the variation in the amount of coca sprayed in
Colombia annually.

In addition, all models are statistically significant at the 99%

confidence level (or alpha .01). In all three cases, the data indicate that the effects of
autocorrelation cannot be determined with a Durbin-Watson statistic around 2.4. In sum,
foreign assistance (of any type), in addition to, all other control variables, show no
relationship with the number of kidnappings in Colombia. Therefore, foreign assistance
does not seem to have influenced overall guerilla activity in Colombia with respect to the
number of kidnappings (per thousand inhabitants).
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The multivariate regression analysis that examines the relationship between the
amount of U.S. foreign aid and Colombia’s homicide rate is presented in Table 7. 19 If
foreign assistance is effective, then as aid to Colombia increases, the effects of guerrilla
violence should decrease. Specifically, one would assume that as aid increased, the
homicide rate would decrease. However, the data indicate that there is no significant
relationship between the amount of aid given to Colombia (of any type) and change in
Colombia’s homicide rate. This may be consistent with earlier discussions regarding
how aid is often not distributed to those in need (Boon 1996:292). If aid does not serve
to alleviate inequalities in a society, then it is unlikely to decrease the violence, which is
often rooted these inequalities (UNODC 2003:9). This failure to address underlying
causes of manifest problems may thereby render aid ineffective in this context and yield a
null result in the statistical analysis. 20
Another alternative explanation could be the presence of corruption within
Colombia’s law enforcement. If law enforcement officials are involved in the drug trade,
then one would expect to see no connection between homicides rates and aid money
given to corrupt agencies. Giving additional aid to combat guerrilla activity is counterproductive if the money is going to a corrupt institution that is responsible curbing
guerrilla violence.
Across all three models, GDP per capita was statistically significant at the 95%
confidence level (or alpha .05). These data indicated that as Colombia’s GDP per capita
increased, Colombia’s homicide rate decreased.

19
20

With every $1,000 increase in

Table 7 is located in Appendix A.
The dependent variable discussed here is the change in Colombia’s homicide rate, not its homicide rate.
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Colombia’s GDP per capita, the homicide rate decreased by about .03 per one thousand
people. In 1986, Colombia’s homicide rate was significantly higher than usual, at .08. If,
for example, the GDP per capita had increased in 1998 by $1,000, the homicide rate
could have decreased by .03, which indicates a substantively significant decrease in
homicides by nearly half the total in that year. These findings are as expected. I have
hypothesized that as Colombia’s economy improves, more money is available for the
government to increase security throughout Colombia and to battle drug trafficking that is
correlated to homicides.
In addition to GDP per capita, data in Models 1 and 2 for total aid and economic
aid respectively indicated that as Colombia’s president is conservative, the homicide rate
is also expected to decrease.

Specifically, when the president of Colombia was

conservative, the homicide rate decreased by about .04. This is most likely due to an
emphasis within the Conservative party on law enforcement.
However, in all three models the R-squared value is very low and none of the F
values are statistically significant. This indicates that all three models are very weak. In
addition, the Durbin-Watson statistic across all models is in the area of indeterminacy
with a value of about 1.5. In sum, there is no relationship between foreign assistance and
a change in the number of homicides (per thousand inhabitants) in Colombia. However,
as expected, as Colombia’s economy is stimulated, Colombia’s homicide rate decreased.
Also, in two of the models, the Colombian president’s party affiliation had a statistically
significant effect of reducing then number of homicides.
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Analysis of Drug Production
To test the relationship between U.S. foreign aid and Colombia’s overall drug
production, I regress all categories of aid on the amount of estimated cultivation of coca
(ha) in Colombia from 1983-2002. The multivariate regression analysis that examines
the relationship between the amount of estimated cultivation of coca (ha) and the amount
of foreign assistance is presented in Table 8. 21 If foreign aid projects are successful at
curbing overall drug production in Colombia, as foreign assistance increased to
Colombia, the amount of estimated cultivation of coca should decrease. However, data in
each model show that there is no significant relationship between the amount of foreign
aid (of any type) and the amount of estimated cultivation of coca (ha) in Colombia.
One of the primary objectives of U.S. aid to Colombia, over the years, has been to
decrease the cultivation of coca. Not only have aid programs supported aerial fumigation
to discourage the growth of coca crops, but the Colombian government has also increased
efforts in order to persuade farmers to give up growing illicit crops, by providing them
with whatever they need to successfully cultivate alternative agricultural produce. This
includes money, machines, and even farm animals (Veilette 2005:5). Although many of
these sorts of programs have been supported by U.S. assistance, the data suggest that aid
has also been ineffective in this area.
The two major programs designed to address coca cultivation include aerial
fumigation and alternative development programs. Both are designed to reduce coca
cultivation, however, both approaches have their limitations.

First, apart from the

controversy surrounding aerial fumigation, this approach to influencing estimated
21

Table 8 is located in Appendix A.
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cultivation does not eliminate the actual coca crop—instead, it just frustrates its growth.
According to Cassen, one reason that foreign aid programs often fail, is due to poor
design. Although the United States has supported aerial fumigation, one could argue that
aerial fumigation programs fall into the pitfall just mentioned. Aerial fumigation is
expensive, dangerous, and overall ineffective at addressing the overall cultivation of
coca. In addition, most coca growing areas are under control of the country’s guerilla
groups. Therefore, alternative crop development programs are only likely to affect a
small number of farmers.

Also, alternative development programs are voluntary.

Therefore, even if landowners are open to receiving help from the government, they may
be fearful that getting help from the government would put them at more of a risk, since
farmers are often targeted by guerrilla groups. According to the UNODC (2003), the
goal behind many homicides is to eliminate those who are collaborating with opposing
factions. This creates fear, terror, and displacement. If farmers voluntarily work with
alternative development programs, they may be putting themselves at more of a risk, than
if they worked with the guerrillas.
Although foreign assistance was not statistically significant in this analysis, three
variables are significant across all three models. First, the polity score, used to measure
the level of democracy in Colombia, is statistically significant across all three models at
the 95% confidence level (or alpha of .05). These data indicate that as Colombia became
more democratic, the amount of estimated coca cultivation decreased by approximately
8,000 ha of land for each one-point increase on the 11-point democracy scale. 22 These
findings are consistent with what was expected. As Colombia becomes more democratic,
22

The range for Colombia on the Polity Score from 1980-2002 is a low of 7 and a high of 9.
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people may be more likely to work with the government toward the common goal of
decreasing cultivation. Democratic policies allow the people to have a say in solutions to
the problem. This may be particularly effective when trying to establish alternative
development programs that are geared to meet the needs of farmers, including heightened
security. If civilians can express their needs to the government, and the government has
the means available to meet their needs, then alternative development programs may be
more likely to succeed—possibly decreasing cultivation.
In addition to Colombia’s level of democracy, the amount of estimated cultivation
is also expected to decrease as Colombia’s rural population density increases.
Specifically, for every additional percent increase in rural population density, the amount
of estimated cultivation should decrease by about 2,000 ha of land.

As the rural

population becomes more concentrated, the amount of actual land available to be
cultivated may actually be decreasing, which provides less space for coca cultivation
specifically. So, as rural population density increases, the overall cultivation of coca
declines.
Finally, unemployment has a statistically significant positive relationship with
coca cultivation across all three models at the 99% confidence level (or alpha of .01).
This finding suggests that with every additional percent increase in Colombia’s
unemployment rate, the estimated cultivation of coca is expected to increase by about
22,000 ha of land. This is true across all three models. This is also consistent with what I
hypothesized above. As unemployment increases, people may go to extreme measures to
do what is necessary to provide for their families and for themselves, making them more
likely to get involved with drug activity. These data indicate that if programs are
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successful in providing jobs for those who are unemployed, the estimated cultivation of
coca will decrease; therefore, suggesting that aid, which successfully targets economic
problems such as unemployment, is likely to have the positive effect of reducing coca
production.
Across all three models, the R-squared value is high and all three F values are
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level (or alpha .01), indicating that the
model fits the data well. Although, it is likely that much of this model fit can be
attributed to the large and statically significant trend variable included in the model to
account for over-time trends in the dependent variable. On the other hand, all three
Durbin-Watson statistics are around 1.6, thus, the effects of autocorrelation cannot be
determined, which should cause some caution when interpreting the results.
In sum, as expected, foreign assistance has shown no relationship with the
estimated cultivation of coca (ha) in Colombia. This is likely attributed to the fact that
both of the programs designed to target cultivation are poorly designed and are not
expected to produce a desired outcome. However, the data indicate that as Colombia
became more democratic, estimated cultivation decreased.

Also, an increase in

Colombia’s rural population density is expected to decrease cultivation, as available land
decreases.

Finally, as expected, Colombia’s unemployment rate has a positive

relationship with estimated cultivation; as Colombia’s unemployment rate increased, the
amount of estimated cultivation increased.
In conclusion, after testing the relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and
the broader areas of Colombian society that that have been primary targets for U.S.
assistance over the years (Colombia’s law enforcement activity, guerrilla violence, and
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overall drug production), I find the following.

First, when testing the relationship

between foreign aid and those dependent variables that measure the level of Colombia’s
law enforcement, the analysis suggests that there is no relationship between foreign
assistance and the number of drug labs destroyed, the amount of cocaine and base seized
(kilos), and the amount of coca sprayed (ha). Further, only in some cases do the variables
that control for Colombia’s presidential party affiliation, its GDP per capita, and its polity
score, have an influence on law enforcement activity. Each of these three variables have
notable effects on only one of the three measures of drug-related law enforcement
activity.
After testing the relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and those variables
used to assess Colombia’s guerrilla violence, the analysis indicates that there is no causal
relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and the number of kidnappings (per
thousand in habitants) or the number of homicides (per thousand inhabitants). However,
both GDP per capita and presidential party affiliation have a statistical relationship with
Colombia’s homicide rate. As Colombia’s GDP per capita increased, and its president
belongs to the Conservative party, the number of homicides decreased. These findings
are consistent with the expectations that more prosperity will decrease crime, and the
conservative presidents are more focused on and successful at reducing crime.
Finally, after testing the relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and
Colombia’s drug production, the data indicate that there is no causal relationship between
the amount of aid and estimated coca cultivation. Although foreign aid is not statistically
significant, improving Colombian democracy and increasing rural population density,
both reduce the amount of estimated coca cultivation.

However, an increase in
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Colombia’s unemployment rate is expected to increase the estimated cultivation of coca
(ha). Throughout all six tables, foreign assistance showed no relationship to the variables
that represented the broader areas of Colombia’s society.
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Conclusion
No country has suffered the negative consequences of violence, guerrilla activity,
and drug-related activity more than Colombia. Even a brief analysis of Colombia’s
history reveals a recurring pattern of internal conflict. Initially, such conflict resulted
from political violence between the Conservative and Liberal parties. In response to the
political violence, multiple guerrilla groups emerged throughout the countryside.
Although guerrillas originally organized to provide protection, they would soon discover
lucrative opportunities in the drug trade, and subsequently, terrorize the people whose
interests they once guarded.
As the relationship between guerillas and drug traffickers became more
intertwined, profits attained by the drug trade allowed groups such as the FARC, ELN
and AUC to become very wealthy and powerful—therefore having more of an influence
than the Colombian government. By the early 1980s, Colombia was weak, divided, and
dominated by guerrillas and drug traffickers.
With the end of the Cold War, the United States was able to turn its attention from
preventing communist influences around the world, to addressing the consequences of the
drug trade.

By the late 1980s and early 1990s, U.S. foreign assistance was being

distributed in order to decrease the cultivation of drugs and to increase interdiction efforts
—especially in Colombia.
In 1999, Colombian President Andrés Pastrana was elected into office. Eager to
improve Colombia’s situation, Pastrana worked to restore U.S.-Colombian relations. By
2000, the United States responded to his earlier request for assistance and allotted $3.1
billion in foreign assistance to Colombia under “Plan Colombia.” The purpose of this
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initiative was to help stimulate Colombia’s economy, to assist Colombia in its armed
conflict, and most importantly, to offer aid for anti-narcotic efforts (in terms of
preventing cultivation and reducing the distribution of drugs).
Although the United States has given billions of dollars in foreign assistance in
order to support the Colombian government in fighting guerrilla activity and curbing the
drug trade, the actual impact of foreign assistance in Colombia is undetermined. Scholars
continue to debate the actual effectiveness of foreign aid in achieving these and other
similar macroeconomic and political goals. Studies that survey the impact of foreign aid
programs in developing countries have found that, overall, aid can have a positive effect
on the country.

For example, some foreign aid programs have been successful at

decreasing the price of food in poor countries. This has had a positive impact on those
countries because it has allowed more people to afford to buy food. However, when the
direct effect of foreign assistance on the growth of a developing country is tested
empirically, scholars have found more ambiguous results. For example, scholars such as
Griffin and Enos (1970) and Peter Boon (1996), found that aid is not a determinant for
growth. On the other hand, scholars such as Burnside and Dollar (2000), found that aid
does impact growth, but only when the policies of the recipient country are strong.
Durbarry (1998) also found a positive relationship between foreign aid and growth. This
continual debate regarding the effectiveness of foreign assistance on developing countries
is often called the “micro-macro paradox.” On a micro-level of studying the impact of
specific foreign assistance programs, aid seems to have a positive effect through the
successful completion of these specific programs. However, studies that examine the
impact of aid on more macro-level outcomes, such as growth, are divided over the
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effectiveness of aid. It is clear from all of these studies that aid is only effective under a
very controlled set of circumstances.
In order to address this paradox, I tested the effectiveness of U.S. foreign
assistance on three broad areas of Colombian society which have been the target of U.S.
foreign aid objectives overtime. These broad areas include Colombia’s drug-related law
enforcement activity, guerrilla violence, and overall drug production. Specifically, in
order to analyze the impact of foreign assistance on Colombia’s law enforcement activity,
I tested the relationship between U.S. foreign aid and the number of drug labs destroyed,
the amount of cocaine and base seized (kilos), and the amount of coca sprayed in
Colombia from 1981-2001. To examine the influence of foreign assistance on guerrilla
violence, I tested the relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and the number of
reported kidnappings from 1990-2002 and the number of homicides from 1980-2002.
Finally, in order to test the impact of foreign assistance on overall drug production in
Colombia, I tested the relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and the estimated
cultivation of coca from 1983-2002.
Using available data that generally cover the years 1980-2002, I explore this
relationship in two ways.

First, I examine the bivariate relationship between each

dependent variable and the total amount of U.S. assistance to Colombia by examining
their movement over time in graphs.

By design, of course, these results were

inconclusive and limited, but they did suggest the lack of a connection between aid and
the policy goals it sought to achieve in Colombia. However, this finding was then
confirmed by the multivariate time-series analysis of each dependent variable. In this
analysis, I tested the relationship of U.S. foreign assistance (total, economic, and
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military) on all six dependent variables, while controlling for other factors. The results of
this analysis indicate that there is no significant connection between the amount of
foreign assistance given to Colombia and any of the policy goals examined. These
findings are most consistent with research conducted by Peter Boon whose theories
suggest that aid does not reach those in need. Findings in this analysis support that
theory and imply that, due to corruption and weak institutions, U.S. foreign assistance is
not reaching those it is intended to help.
Although foreign aid did not have a statistically significant relationship with any
of the policy goals, other independent variables that were controlled for throughout the
analysis were statistically significant. For example, when analyzing Colombia’s drugrelated law enforcement activity, data indicates that Colombia’s presidential party
affiliation is statistically significant.

Ironically, if Colombia’s president was

conservative, the number of drug labs destroyed decreased, but the amount of coca
sprayed increased. This suggests that with respect to drug-related law enforcement
efforts, a Conservative president may approach combating drug activity by increasing
efforts to deter the actual cultivation of coca, instead of interdiction efforts. Colombia’s
presidential party affiliation was not only statistically significant when analyzing drugrelated law enforcement, but it was also statically significant with respect to Colombia’s
guerrilla activity—as it relates to Colombia’s homicide rate.

Data indicates that if

Colombia’s president belongs to the Conservative party, then Colombia’s homicide rate
will decrease. Therefore, it seems as if policies that are generally accepted by the
Conservative party stress the importance of illicit drug cultivation and heightened
protection for its citizens.
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In addition to presidential party affiliation, results indicated that Colombia’s
economic situation would impact all three policy objectives. Specifically, as Colombia’s
economy was stimulated, interdiction efforts increased. This is expected, because as
Colombia’s economy flourishes, the government will have more means necessary to
combat the drug trade—thus increasing interdiction efforts.

Also, when examining

guerrilla activity, Colombia’s economic situation influenced its homicide rate.

As

Colombia’s economy was stimulated, the number of homicides decreased. This indicates
that in addition to having the means necessary to increase security throughout the
country, a good economic environment may deter civilians from getting involved in the
drug trade. Finally, along the same lines, when examining Colombia’s overall drug
production, the effect of Colombia’s unemployment rate was statistically significant. As
Colombia’s unemployment rate increased, the estimated cultivation of coca also
increased—indicating that Colombia’s economic environment is a significant determinant
of reaching all three policy goals.
Finally, Colombia’s level of democracy was statistically significant when
exploring Colombia’s drug-related law enforcement efforts and its overall drug
production. Specifically, as Colombia became more democratic, the amount of coca
spraying decreased as did the amount of estimated cultivation. This is not surprising
since aerial fumigation is such a controversial subject. Many farmers and civilians have
expressed their concerns about how it affects their crops and health. One can conclude
that as Colombia becomes more democratic, the Colombian people will have more input
as to how Colombia’s drug problem should be addressed.

This may encourage
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Colombian civilians to assist the government in finding a solution to its drug
predicament.
Overall, the results support the argument that aid has not been effective in
Colombia. Given the macro-level focus of this analysis on broad outcomes rather than on
very specific program success, these findings should not be surprising. Most other
similar studies have failed to find a connection between aid and macro-level indicators.
The only exceptions (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Durbarry 1998) are studies that found a
macro-level impact for aid only when the recipient country had the capacity for positive
policy implementation.

Given the weakness of Colombian government institutions

(Griffin and Enos 1970) as well as other problems that undermine policy effectiveness, it
makes sense that U.S. aid to Colombia has thus far been largely unsuccessful in achieving
the wide-ranging policy outcomes it seeks. According to Griffin and Enos (1970),
foreign aid is likely to fail when there are poor policies and institutions in place.
Although Colombia’s policies may be strong, its institutions are weak and therefore may
hinder foreign assistance from being distributed effectively.
Furthermore, corruption has existed at all levels of Colombia’s society. In fact,
instances have surfaced where Colombian police have used U.S. narcotics foreign aid to
pay for unauthorized trips.

Also in the past, officials throughout the Colombian

government (usually law enforcement) have been suspected of worked with drug
traffickers. Therefore, if foreign assistance is going to improve those areas of Colombian
society that are corrupt, aid is most likely going to be ineffective and possibly
counterproductive.
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Additionally, although the United States and Colombia have remained on close
terms throughout the years, there have been times where U.S.-Colombian relations were
detrimental to the effect of aid in Colombia. In fact, Crandall (2001) discusses how the
United States became so obsessed with taking down President Samper, it actually
hindered the United States from meeting policy goals.
Finally, as Boon (1996) suggests, foreign assistance my not be effective because it
does not go to those it is intended to help. Boon argues that often times, foreign
assistance does not reach the poor. It is not effective because it does not change the
policies that favor the elite. Therefore, when foreign assistance is distributed, it stays
within the government and never reaches civil society. If foreign assistance given to
Colombia is not reaching those that it is intended to help, then it is no surprise that it has
been ineffective. For example, if foreign assistance does not reach those farmers who
volunteer to work with alternative crop development programs, then farmers may have no
choice but to work with drug traffickers to get what is necessary to survive. From a more
general perspective, if foreign assistance is given in order to improve law enforcement in
Colombia, but the aid does not go towards improving both the capacity and the honesty
of Colombia’s police and military, it may hinder the ability of law enforcement to
increase security from border to border.
After a brief overview of Colombia’s history, one can see how Colombia may
need assistance in addressing its social, economic, and political problems. However,
assistance alone is not enough. In the case of Colombia, we have seen that aid alone has
limited capacities. In order to increase the likelihood that foreign assistance may be
effective, aid funds should be focused on promoting good policies and strong institutions
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and eliminating opportunities for corruption. Furthermore, aid should focus on dual
positive effects of improving the lives of the Colombian people and mitigating the impact
of the drug trade.
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Appendix A
Table 1. Emergence and Consolidation of the Traditional Political Parties through
Civil Wars (1827-1910)
Years

President or ruler

Opponents

Nature/Outcome

18271832
18391842

Francisco de Paula
Santander
General Pedro Alcántara
Herrán

Santanderistas and
Bolvianos
Ministeriales/
Uncoordinated regional
movements

1851

José Hilario López

1854

General José Maria
Obando(1853-54)
General José Maria Melo
(1854)

Liberals /Conservatives
(Slaveowners)
Draconiano Liberals/
Gólgota Liberals (profederalism, free trade,
and anti-army)

18611863

Tomás C. de Mosquera

Radical Liberals and
Draconiano Liberals/
Conservatives

18761877

Aquileo Parra

Radical Liberals/
Rafael Núñez,
Conservatives, and
army leaders.

18841885

Rafael Núñez

“Unión Nacional”/
Radical Liberals

1885

Rafael Núñez and La
Regeneración

National Party/ Radical
Liberals

18921895

Rafael Núñez and Miguel
Antonio Caro

National Conservative/
Revolutionary Liberals

18991902

José M. Marroquin

Historic and
Nationalist
Conservatives/
Civilista Rev. Liberals

Major conflict: break up of Gran
Colombia.
Civil War: “War of the Supremes.”
Defeat of pro-federalist regional
movements, continued rule by
conservative forces.
Civil War: Conservatives were
defeated.
Civil War: Sparked by Coup d’état
led by General José Maria Melo and
supported by Draconiano Liberals
and artisans. Liberals crushed.
Significant defeat for military.
Civil War: Defeat of Conservatives
who had been in control of
government. Church property
nationalized, enactment of other antiChurch reforms and federalist
Constitution.
Civil War after election.
Conservatives hoped to take
advantage of Liberal division, instead
lead to temporary Liberal unification
and Conservative defeat.
Liberal division and economic crisis
placed country near civil war in
1884.
Civil War: Núñez joined by
Conservatives, defeats Radical
Liberals. Leads to increased
centralization and closer Church-state
relations.
Civil War in 1895. Brief and
regionally concentrated. Rev.
Liberals, unsupported by other
Liberals, led to temporary
Conservative unification and Liberal
defeat.
Civil War: “War of One Thousand
Days.” Both sides divided, 100,000
casualties, economic collapse, and no
Conservatives gain control.

Source: Hartlyn 1988:21
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Table 2. Key Concepts and Variables
Concept

Key Dependent Variables

Source

Law Enforcement

Number of Drug Labs Destroyed
in Colombia, 1981-2001.

Policía Nacional de Colombia

Law Enforcement

Amount of Cocaine and Base
Seized (kilos) in Colombia,
1981-2001.

Policía Nacional de Colombia

Law Enforcement

Amount of Coca Crop Sprayed
(ha) in Colombia, 1981-2001.

Policía Nacional de Colombia

Guerrilla Violence

Number of Reported
Kidnappings (per thousand
inhabitants) in Colombia, 19902002.

Policía Nacional de Colombia

Guerrilla Violence

Number of Homicides (per
thousand in habitants) in
Colombia, 1980-2002.

Policía Nacional de Colombia

Overall Drug Production

Amount of Estimated
Cultivation of Coca (ha) in
Colombia, 1983-2002).

International Narcotics Strategy
Report

Concept

Key Independent Variables

Source

Total Foreign Assistance

Total Loans and Grants to
Colombia, 1980-2002.

USAID Greenbook

Economic Foreign Assistance

Economic Loans and Grants to
Colombia, 1980-2002.

USAID Greenbook

Military Foreign Assistance

Military Loans and Grants to
Colombia, 1980-2002.

USAID Greenbook

Concept

Key Control Variables

Source

Level of Democracy

Colombia’s Polity Score, 19802002.

Polity IV

Colombia’s Average Income

Colombia’s GDP per Capita,
1980-2002.

World Development Indicators
2004

President’s Party Affiliation

Dummy Variable for
Colombia’s Conservative
Presidents.

CIA Factbook: Colombia

Level of Unemployment

Colombia’s Unemployment
Rate, 1980-2002.

International Labor Office

Land Availability for Coca
Cultivation

Colombia’s Rural Population
Density, 1980-2002.

World Development Indicators
2004
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Table 3. The Effect of U.S. Aid on the Number of Drug Labs Destroyed in
Colombia, 1981-2001
Variable

1. Total Loans
and Grants

2. Economic
Loans and Grants

3. Military Loans
and Grants

Total Loans and
Grants

-.328
(.387)

-

-

Economic Loans
and Grants

-

-.262
(.387)

-

Military Loans and
Grants

-

-

-3.161
(2.710)

-71.952
(123.696)

-77.322
(124.783)

-29.275
(128.390)

-.744
(.513)

-.722
(.525)

-.398
(.480)

Trend

148.510
(101.941)

142.372
(104.167)

81.194
(90.580)

Conservative
President

-413.323*
(207.048)

-418.729*
(208.550)

-383.497*
(205.498)

Constant

3131.533*
(1686.152)

3121.931*
(1729.803)

1906.946
(1742.739)

1.910

1.862

1.915

N

21

21

21

R2

.252

.240

.282

F

1.012

.945

1.176

Polity Score
GDP per Capita

Durbin-Watson

Note: Estimated Using OLS Regression, SPSS 14. Numbers in parenthesis represent
standard error.
* significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%, ***significant at 99%
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Table 4. The Effect of U.S. Aid on the Amount of Cocaine and Base Seized (kilos)
in Colombia, 1981-2001
Variable

1.Total Loans and
Grants

2. Economic
Loans and Grants

3. Military Loans
and Grants

Total Loans and
Grants

13.214
(17.016)

-

-

Economic Loans
and Grants

-

10.084
(17.025)

-

Military Loans and
Grants

-

-

151.787
(117.732)

9027.481
(5456.003)

9245.933
(5490.649)

6928.423
(5578.582)

56.189**
(22.560)

55.019**
(23.099)

40.927*
(20.862)

Trend

-7942.780
(4486.536)

-7631.695
(4583.520)

-5028.914
(3935.721)

Conservative
President

4557.249
(9112.371)

4784.143
(9176.526)

3045.226
(8928.957)

Constant

-222528.0
(74209.137)

-221449.5**
(76114.189)

-166746.3
(75722.598)

2.021

1.997

2.302

N

21

21

21

R2

.712

.708

.731

F

7.428***

7.260***

8.136***

Polity Score
GDP per Capita

Durbin-Watson

Note: Estimated Using OLS Regression, SPSS 14. Numbers in parenthesis represent
standard error.
* significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%, ***significant at 99%
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Table 5. The Effect of U.S. Aid on the Amount of Coca Sprayed (ha) in Colombia,
1981-2001
Variable

1. Total Loans
and Grants

2. Economic
Loans and Grants

3. Military Loans
and Grants

Total Loans and
Grants

-13.066
(12.942)

-

-

Economic Loans
and Grants

-

-10.548
(12.990)

-

Military Loans and
Grants

-

-

-120.333
(90.432)

-11406.616**
(4149.490)

-11620.195**
(4189.284)

-9793.684**
(4285.023)

-23.815
(17.158)

-23.003
(17.624)

-10.305
(16.025)

Trend

7594.016**
(3412.175)

7363.777*
(3497.158)

4957.791
(3023.107)

Conservative
President

1207.108
(6930.292)

10993.676
(7001.554)

12323.881*
(6858.514)

135103.38**
(56438.766)

134877.15
(58073.998)

87789.662
(58164.074)

1.694

1.698

1.607

N

21

21

21

R2

.885

.883

.890

F

23.132***

22.545***

24.358***

Polity Score
GDP per Capita

Constant
Durbin-Watson

Note: Estimated Using OLS Regression, SPSS 14. Numbers in parenthesis represent
standard error.
* significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%, ***significant at 99%
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Table 6. The Effect of U.S. Aid on the Number of Kidnappings (per thousand
inhabitants) in Colombia, 1990-2002
Variable

1. Total Loans
and Grants

2. Economic
Loans and Grants

3. Military Loans
and Grants

Total Loans and
Grants

2.02E-005
(.000)

-

-

Economic Loans
and Grants

-

1.86E-005
(.000)

-

Military Loans and
Grants

-

-

5.06E-005
(.000)

-.001
(.004)

-.002
(.004)

-.001
(.006)

-3.28E-005
(.000)

-.002
(.004)

-5.62E-005
(.000)

Unemployment Rate

.001
(.003)

.001
(.003)

-.002
(.004)

Trend

.006
(.005)

.006
(.005)

.011*
(.005)

Conservative
President

.010
(.007)

.010
(.008)

.008
(.009)

Constant

.148
(.103)

.168
(.102)

.205
(.156)

Durbin-Watson

2.504

2.424

2.385

N

13

13

13

R2

.927

.923

.884

F

12.753***

11.970***

7.630**

Polity Score
GDP per Capita

Note: Estimated Using OLS Regression, SPSS 14. Numbers in parenthesis represent
standard error.
* significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%, ***significant at 99%
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Table 7. The Effect of U.S. Aid on the Change in the Number of Homicides (per
thousand inhabitants) in Colombia, 1980-2002
Variable

1. Total Loans
and Grants

2. Economic
Loans and Grants

3. Military Loans
and Grants

Total Loans and
Grants

7.06E-005
(.000)

-

-

Economic Loans
and Grants

-

6.42E-005
(000)

-

Military Loans and
Grants

-

-

.000
(.000)

.001
(.017)

.002
(.017)

-.003
(.019)

-3.20E-005**
(.000)

-3.07E-005**
(.000)

-2.98E-005**
(.000)

.010
(.008)

.010
(.008)

.014
(.008)

-.042**
(.023)

-.041*
(.023)

-.003
(.024)

Constant

.143
(.161)

131
(.162)

.159
(.179)

Durbin-Watson

1.693

1.650

1.553

N

22

22

22

R2

.375

.362

.304

F

1.924

1.815

1.399

Polity Score
GDP per Capita
Unemployment Rate
Conservative
President

Note: Estimated Using OLS Regression, SPSS 14. Numbers in parenthesis represent
standard error.
* significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%, ***significant at 99%
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Table 8. The Effect of U.S. Foreign Aid on the Estimated Cultivation of Coca (ha)
in Colombia, 1983-2002
Variable

1. Total Loans
and Grants

2. Economic
Loans and Grants

3. Military Loans
and Grants

Total Loans and
Grants

-5.151
(10.409)

-

-

Economic Loans
and Grants

-

-5.025
(10.432)

-

Military Loans and
Grants

-

-

-5.166
(63.174)

-8357.887**
(3109.823)

-8438.830**
(3130.981)

-8142.451**
(3303.588)

GDP per Capita

-29.501
(17.603)

-29.601
(17.714)

-26.822
(17.140)

Rural Population
Density

-2126.585**
(973.237)

-2129.394*
(980.687)

-1920.551*
(900.973)

Unemployment Rate

22376.039***
(2596.509)

22376.713***
(2606.251)

22717.103***
(2534.166)

Trend

13795.489***
(3535.540)

13804.290***
(3568.742)

12921.122***
(3149.314)

4595.254
(4455.275)

4560.592
(4452.346)

4419.429
(4494.885)

149071.86**
(52279.339)

150040.59**
(53580.570)

135877.23**
(49487.683)

1.622

1.648

1.584

N

20

20

20

R2

.995

.995

.995

F

319.460***

319.122***

313.212***

Polity Score

Conservative
President
Constant
Durbin-Watson

Note: Estimated Using OLS Regression, SPSS 14. Numbers in parenthesis represent
standard error.
* significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%, ***significant at 99%
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Figure 1. Total U.S. Loans and Grants to Colombia, 1980-2002
Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants 2006
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Figure 2. Number of Drug Labs Destroyed in Colombia, 1981-2001
Source: Policía Nacional de Colombia 2006; U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants 2006
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Figure 3. Amount of Cocaine and Base Seized (kilos) and Coca Sprayed (ha) in
Colombia, 1981-2001
Source: Policía Nacional de Colombia 2006
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Figure 4. Number of Kidnappings (per thousand inhabitants) in Colombia, 19902002
Source: Policía Nacional de Colombia 2006
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Figure 5. Number of Homicides (per thousand inhabitants) in Colombia, 1980-2002
Source: Policía Nacional de Colombia 2006
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Figure 6. Estimated Cultivation of Coca (ha) in Colombia, 1983-2002
Source: International Narcotics Strategy Report 2006
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